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AB TRA CT

Definin g Predatory Mortgage Lending in Uta h:
A Pro fess ional Perspecti ve

by

Luke V. Eri ckson, Master of Science
Utah State Uni vers ity, 2006

Major Professo r: Dr. Lucy Delgad ill o
Departm ent: Family, Co nsum er, and Hum an Deve lopment

Th e purpose of thi s stud y was to defin e and desc ribe the nature o f predatory
mortgage lendin g in th e stat e of Utah . Twe lve profess ionals from th e state who wo rk in
the mo rtgage lendin g market parti cipated. Data co nsisted of interviewee eom ment s and
were analyzed qualitati ve ly usi ng a mult i-step method of codin g for co ncepts and themes.
Through coding and analys is it was determin ed that the term predatory mortgage
lend ing is defin ed as an act of abuse that is targeted towa rds a borrower with one or more
vuln erabl e characterist ics. It was al so fo und that users of this term do not always adh ere
to thi s stri ct definition, but rath er use it as a catch-a ll term fo r any general mortgage
ab use, rath er than on ly for those that are targe ted. Th e term is al so used when referrin g
to instances of fraud , and nearl y all other form s of unfair lending.
To help increase the measurability of predatory lending, th e interviews also gave
desc ripti ve detai l in terms of it s magnitude, und erl ying factors, co mmonl y occ urring
practi ces, victim charac teri sti cs, impacts, and suggestion s for reduct ion . Suggesti ons for

iv
reduc ti on of predatory lendin g include increas ing acco untabilit y of actors, both legally
and by the industry

it se ll~

bridging state and national jurisd ictional gaps, and increasing

fun ding for co nsumer education and neighborhood revitali zation . Education was
espec iall y emphasized as a too l fo r preventing occ urrences of predatory mortgage
lendin g. not only in the form ofprc-homebuye r ed ucation but espec iall y in th e fo rm of
financial ed ucation as a requirement in the public school s, beginning at a very yo ung age.
( 134 pages)
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CHAPT ER I
TRODUCTIO

Problem Statement

Th e Mort gage Bankers Assoc iati on estimat ed that $2.5 trillion in mortgage loans
wou ld be made during 2005 (Federal Bureau of In vest igation , 2005). Becau se o f their
sheer size, the mot1gage lending and the housing mark ets have a signifi cant impact on th e
nation's overa ll economy (Federal Bureau of Investi gation). With nearl y 70% of
Ameri cans ow ning homes and the majorit y o f those spending between 25-50% o f th eir
in co mes on ho usin g, it is easy to sec why th e mark et is so vast (Colton, 2003).
In an effort by the federal govern ment to improve affordab ilit y, the mort gage
lending mark et has been deregul ated over th e last se ve ral decades (E nge l & McCoy,
2002). Beca use of increased freedom to lend without government imposed caps on
interest rates and fees , and the ab il it y to trade bund les of sec uriti zed loans on the mark et
and to qui ck ly estimate a borrower's cred it risk , lenders have beco me far mo re wi lli ng
than in the past to lend large amounts of money to very risky bo1Towers (E ngel &
McCoy). Thus nearly anyo ne can secure a loan at so me pri ce (Enge l & McCoy). Thi s
ri skier sec tion of th e mortgage lendin g mark et has been labeled subprim e lendin g.
The subp rim e lending market has ex isted for decades, but it ex ploded in the earl y
I 990s, growin g from an estimated 535 billi on in 1994 to $2 20 billi on in 2002 (Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2003; Lord, 2005; U.S. Department of Housing, 2000). From
I 993 to I 998 th e numbers of loans made by lend ers spec iali zing in subprim e loans grew
nearl y I 0 times from I 04,000 to 997,000 (Lo rd; U.S. Department of Housing).

Secu riti zation ofsubprime loans grew from Sl l billion in 1994to $203 billion in 2003;
th e nearly 20-fold increase demonstrating a continued and widespread acceptance of
in vestm ent in high ri sk loans (Lord).
Not all of the g rowth has been positi ve, however. Between th e yea rs 1990 to
1998 foreclosures grew 384% (U.S. Census Bureau , 1999). In 1993, s ubprim e lendin g
and serv ices accounted for 1.4% of the forec losu res, but in 1998. 35.7% of forec losu res
were subprim e and thi s percentage is ex pec ted to increase (National Training and
In formation Center, 1999). The news head lin es also became riddl ed with accounts of
un ethi cal and unsc rupulous lenders who were making profits at th e expense of
uns uspectin g borrowers; an epid emi c dubbed " predatory lend ing" (McCoy & Wy ly,
2004).
According to McCoy and Wy ly (2004 ), from 1992 to 1999 the average number of
art ic les in major U.S. newspapers with "predato ry" a nd "mortgage" in the head line, lead
paragraph, or subject terms, was about 20 per year, while the average number of articles
fittin g the same criteria from 2000-2003 was rou ghl y 200 per year, or ten tim es hi gher.
Us in g conservative figure s, Stein (2001) estim ated that direct annual lo sses to U.S.
co nsum ers from predatory le ndin g practi ces were at a minimum, $9. 1 billion. T hi s
con serva tiv e fig ure does not inc lude a ny losses to individ uals or ne ighborhoods beca use
of ex cessive foreclosures , nor does it inc lude the more s ubt le predatory lend ing practices,
wh ich are ever increasing (Stein).
According to a H UD/Treasury joi nt report (U.S. Department of Hou sing, 2000},
these types of loans do indeed increase foreclo s ure rates, and increase the financial
burde ns of homeowners, which often resu lts in th ei r bankruptcy (Sullivan , Warren , &

Westbrook, 2000). By th eir very nature, predatory loa ns decrease the fin anc ial stab ilit y
of a househo ld; bleeding already vulnerab le households of th eir low-inco mes and savi ngs
(Cordy, 2003; Special Committee on Aging, 2004). Differences betwee n legitimate
subprim e and predatory loan s can be sli ght , but have significant con sequ ences (U .S .
Department

o[

Housing). An adequ ate separation between legitim ate subprim e lendin g

and ill egi timate predatory lendin g is necessa ry in order to reduce the losses to financiall y
vulnerab le households.

Need for Study

The

1-1 UD/Treasury

report (U.S. Department of Hou si ng, 2000) co nveyed th e idea

that defin in g predato ry mortgage lendin g is a prob lematic task beca use bad actors 1 are
co n tantl y deve loping new and abusive lendin g practi ces, often with a specifi c int ent to
avo id new governm ent regulations (U . ·. Departm ent of Housing). Additionall y,
preda tory lend ing cannot be con lined to a li st of unethical actions on the part of the
lender beca use predatory loa ns are al so func ti ons of how and to whom th ey are made.
For examp le, a prepayment penalty may be ethical in a case in whi ch a borrower agrees
to it s term s in order to reduce hi s interest rate; however, a lender who in clud es a
prepa yment penalt y without th e know ledge or consent of the borrower, and does not
provid e a bene fit in return such as a reduced interest rate, is unethical. Anoth er reason
th at li sts of predatory acts are insuffi cient is because a loan can often be legi timate while
co ntaining one of the named acts, but on ly when that act is combin ed with anoth er act or

1

The term "bad actor" was used by the U.S. Department of Treasury (2000) and other litt.:rature to describe
all perp~:trators in bad loans. not just lenders. This could include appraisers, brokers. loan omcers, rl!a l
estalt' agems. and any other party thnt acts as a perpetra tor of predatory lending actions.
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circumstance is the loan trul y predatory (U.S. Depa rtm ent of Housing). In an effort to
produce an enco mpassing definition, th e 2000 H UD/Treasury joint report defin ed
predatory lending as follow s:
[Predatory lending] in volves engaging in deception or fraud , manipu lating th e
bo rrowe r through aggress ive sales tac ti cs, or taking unfair advantage of a
borrower 's lack of und erstandi ng about loan term s. These practi ces are often
comb ined with loan term s that , alone or in combination, are ab usive or mak e th e
borrower more vu lnerable to abusive practices. (p. l)
While thi s definition is encompass ing, its generality allows for littl e
enfo rceability. Who is to dec id e when deception, manipulation , aggression a nd unfai r
sa les tacti cs occ ur, and by what standards'l Again. thi s definition has only led to a need
lor further de finiti ons before effecti ve steps ca n be made. It should be no surpri se that
most attempt s to add ress and regulat e predato ry lendi ng have been rebutted wi th th e
argum ent that no one can agree upon a clear and co ncise defi ni tion (Engel & McCoy,
2002).
Opponents of predatory lending reform argue that because the probl em is not
clea rl y definab le, a clear so lution is neither needed nor achievab le. Advocates of reform
argue that , "because yo u know it when yo u see it ," something shou ld obviousl y be done.
The Tru th in Lending Act (TlLA) was one fed era l attempt to add ress unfair lend ing
iss ues (Enge l & McCoy, 2002). Th is leg islati on requires lend ers to clea rly di sc lose
~

fin ance charges, th e principle amou nt borrowed, th e total interest to be paid over the life
of the loan, and th e Annual Percentage Rate (A PR )2 (Lord , 2005). TILA also allows a
bo rrower of a hom e equity loan , or a refin anci ng, three days to cancel the loa n wi thout
1

Annual Percentage Rate {APR) is defined as the "Ann ual cos t of credit over the life of a loan,
inc ludi ng int erest. serv ice charges. point s, loan fees, mortgage insurance, and ot her items

(Monarc h Homes. 2005)."

any penalties (Lord). The Real Estate Settlement Procedu res Act (RES PA) requires
lenders to clearly disc lose fees , and supp ly a Good Fai th Est imate, to reaso nab ly assess
th e tru e costs of a Joan. The Home Ownership Eq uity Protection Act (HO EPA) passed
by Co ngress in I 994 is des igned to offe r protecti ons to borrowers who enter hi gh cost
loa ns. which are defin ed by interest rates that are 8 percent hi gher th an Treas ury Secu rity
rates (Senate Com mittee on Banking, 200 I). Because of loose definitions, weak
pena lti es, and the abilit y of lenders to adapt and wo rk around them, very littl e protection
has actua ll y been provided by these regul atio ns, and they have not signi fica ntl y reduced
the abuses faced by many low-i ncome, minority and elderl y homeowners (Lo rd , 2005;
Senate Com mitt ee on Bank ing). Every year si nce I 999 has seen new state regulati on
cfTo rt s to address predatory lendin g, th ough man y of th ese efforts co nsist of very loose
and ineffecti ve statutes (Enge l & McCoy). To co mpli cate the matter, turf battl es rage
between state and fede ral regulatory agencies over who has jurisdi cti on over certain
lend ers and geographi ca l areas (Lord; U. . Department of Housi ng, 2000).

Purpose of Stud y

Utah possesses at least three alarmin g indi cators of financial troubl e: ( I) Th e stat e
rank s number three out of all 50 states fo r bankruptcy per household (Am eri ca n
Ba nkruptc y In stitute, 2004); (2) It ran ks in the top ten for foreclo sures (M itchell , 2003);
and (3) It rank s in the top ten fo r insta nces of mortgage fraud (Federal Bureau of
Investigat ion, 2005). In addition to th ese strong financial indicators, a fo rm al estimati on
by Stein (2001) concluded that Utah consum ers were victi ms of$9 1 milli on wo rth of
predatory lendin g scams in 2000, with increasin g losses ex pected in subsequen t years.
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Predatory mortgage lending is indeed a serious and esca lating prob lem, spec ifi cal ly for
Utah. but because th ere is no agreed upon de finiti on of predatory lending it is very
diffic ult to track and regulat e
The purpose of thi s stud y was to assess th e nature of abusi ve and hi gh-cos t
(predatory) loan s in Uta h. Because mort gage lending profess ional s have the most
frequent interactions with mortgage lend ers and borrowers than any other gro up in th e
state, they arc co nsid ered the foremost experts on the matter, and are therefore th e focus
or samp le of thi s stud y. Predatory mortgage lending will be examin ed in the context of
mortgage lending profess ionals' ex peri ences, perspecti ves, and ex pert opini o ns.

Objec ti ves

Eac h of th e fol lowing objec ti ves will be meas ured according to th e percepti ons
and perspectives of the twe lve fttll-timc mortgage market partic ipants:
I. oncept uali ze a definition of predatory mo rt gage lending.
2. Determine the ex tent or magnitude of predatory loa ns in Utah.
3. Id en tify the common characteristi cs of th e victim s of these loans.
4. Id enti fy th e major facto rs behind th e ex istence of hi gh cost and abusive home loa ns.
5. Doc um ent spec ific predatory practi ces seen in hom e loans.
6. Determine opt im al strategies for reducing predatory mortgage lendin g in Utah .

Contributions of the Study

The results of this study offer a uniqu e definition of predatory mortgage lending
in Utah by more extensively defining th e problem so that regulation and education mi ght
co nsequent ly be more effective.
Increased awareness of th e nature of unscrupulous lending can lead to fu rther
consum er edu cation and responsiveness, thus significantl y reducing the $9 1 million
figure curren tl y lost by Utah borrowers each year (Stein, 2001). As thi s mark et
ineffi ciency is remedied , market forces wi ll drive predatory lend ers out of bu sin ess whi le
increasin g th e success of legitimate lend ers. Society as a whole will th en benefit through
a decrease in foreclosures in neighborhood s, increased eq uity in the hom es of borrowers,
and in creased hom eownership rates.
The succeeding chapter is a review of relevan t li terature and so urces that offers a
further description of the mortgage lending mark et. Differences and similarities between
the prime, subprime and predatory mark ets, and a comparison to mo11gagc fraud are
emphasized. A general discu ssion ofbO JTower and lender characteri sti cs is presented ,
and the chapter conc lud es with a descripti on of so me of the predatory practi ces th at have
been id entified in prev ious research.
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CHAPT ER II
LIT ERAT URE REVIEW

Hi storica l Factors

The 1949 Hou sing Act se t in place th e too ls needed for man y to rea li ze th e
American dream of ownership of quality homes. Today, thi s dream has been ach ieved by
ma ny Americans and the issues fac ing today's prospecti ve buyers seems to no longer be
the abi lit y to find qualit y housi ng, but th e affordability of these houses (Co lt on, 2003).
Deregul ati on of the mortgage lending mark et was one answer to th e probl em of
affordab ilit y (E ngel & McCoy, 2002). Du e to increased freedo m to lend without
governm ent imposed caps on interes t rates and fees, and th e ability to trade bun dles of
sec uriti zed loans on the market and to qui ckly estim ate a borrower's credit ri sk, lenders
have become far more willing to lend large amounts of money to very ri sky borrowers
(Engel & McCoy). Thus nearly anyone ca n sec ure a loa n at some price, though that price
may be astro no mi ca l (Engel & McCoy). And thu s follows what some have ca ll ed the
mortgage lending cri sis.

Ca uses a/!he !vfongage Crisis

Rises in consumer cred it card debt and th e introduction of the 1986 Tax Reform
Law created an incentive for many to seck debt co nso lidati on pl ans through subprim e
lenders in ord er to take advantage of t he tax deductibi lity of hom e loan interest (Lord,
2005; Senate Com millee on Banking, 200 I). Thi s encouraged consumers to co nvert
unsec ured debt in to sec ured debt whi ch is backed by thei r own homes (Lord; Senate
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Committ ee on Banking). Additiona ll y, each refin anc ing or co nso lidati on strips eq uity
from one ' s home because of the borrowin g aga in st equity, but more irnportam ly, because
o f excess ive fe es th at often do not benefit the borrower in any way. A person delinquent
on a co nso lidated home loan will see th eir ho me on th e auct ion block afte r mi ss in g on ly
several pa yment s, and littl e oppo rtunit y for negotiation (Lord) .
The altern ative to home loan debt co nso lidation, however, is reten ti o n of
un sec ured debt. Those with large unsecured debt s who choose not to consolidate face
co ll ecti on harassment and high rates of bankruptcy, leav ing them wit h impaired cred it
sco res and littl e opportunit y for prim e rates in th e future (Lord, 2005). Tho L•gh man y
wo uld say that consumers have brought these debt traps upon them selves, it is clea r that
these two scenarios leave litt le room for co nsum er optimism today.

ln cretlsing Il eal Est(l{e Values

The va lues of rea l estate in th e co untry in creased substanti all y through th e 90s,
hav ing a particular impact on low and moderate in come homeowners. The ex panded
hom e eq uit y made it possibl e for man y to borrow ex tensively against thei r homes, and
enco uraged lenders to loa n based on eq uit y and not monthl y affordabilit y (Senate
Comm ittee on Banking, 2001 ). Asset based loans are the main co urse of predat ory
lenders because it allows th e lend er to ea rn imm ediate profits through equity stripping in
add iti on to the usual overpri ced monthl y payment s, making these loans ex tremely
lucrati ve (Sturdevelll & Brenn an, 1999). The more times the lender can refina nce the
same c ustomer. the more fees th ey strip fro m th e horne 's equity.
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Mortgage Broker Proliferation

Grow in g from 100,000 to over I million from 1993 to 1999, th e number of homes
brokcrcd in th e subprim e mark et ha s ex ploded (Center for Poli cy Alternati ves, 2005). An
Assoc iation for the Advancement of Retired Perso ns (AARP) resea rch repo rt (Kim -S un g

& Herm anso n, 2003) found that brokers arc in vo lved in over half of all hom e loan
closin gs, with a steadil y rising number each year. Brokers have been known to play a
large role in predatory lending practi ces due to connicting incenti ves. Brokers arc
encouraged to find th e best loans for consumers, yet at the same time th ey arc often paid
more fo r signin g up co nsum ers wi th more ex pensive loans (Kim-Sun g & Hermanso n).
Additional ly, th e brok ers ha ve no in centi ve to ensure long-term stab ilit y of loa ns beca use
they do not ho ld loans through maturit y (Ki m-Su ng & Hermanson). In short , brokers arc
o rt en co nfi·o nt ed with an array ofcon ni ctin g motivations.

Three Mort gage Markets

Only through a di scuss ion of the separate mortgage markets and practices in each
market can predatory lending be und erstood in an app ropriate co ntex t. Relevant
lit erature gives an illustration of predatory lending, and how it evo lved from prev ious
mort gage lending market co ndit ions.

Prime Market

The prime market offers traditional loans to low-risk borrowers (Engel & McCoy,
2002). Compared to subprim e and predatory loans, these loan s are relati ve ly
straightforward , and simple to understand, and in clud e onl y minim al fees, wh ich are

II
usually quite small. Prime market custom ers are usuall y better educated and have better
resources ava il ab le to th em for und erstandi ng the tenn s of loan s than subprim e
customers.

Suhprim e Markel

In the 1980's banks began widely usin g a tool generall y known as ''asse t-backed
sec uriti es" to rea li ze profits more rapidly (Lord, 2005). Loans were bundled together in
groups of hundreds or thou sand s, and so ld on the stock market as mortgage backed
securiti es (Lo rd). Even foreclo sure did not pose ri sk of loss to securi ty in vestors beca use
the loss from eac h foreclosu re was absorbed by the thousa nds of other loans included in
th e sec urit y, was protected by th e homeowners own equity, and was furth er shi eld ed
thro ugh overpric ed credit in surance (Lo rd ; Senate Committee on Banking, 200 I).
The re lati vely safe in vestm ent opportuniti es were sold at sli ghtl y lower rates on
Wall Street than the borrowers were paying. The difference beca me millions of doll ars
of nea rl y instant profits to the lend ers (Lord , 2005). With operating costs covered and
profi ts sk imm ed off, the bulk of the bi lli on dol lar tran saction s cou ld be funn eled ri ght
back int o poo ls for lendin g to homcb uycrs. The lending industry's liquidity of billions
had been increased through the securit izati on of loan s in th e secondary mark et, makin g
avai lab le unpreced ented leve ls of cash for lending (Senate Committee on Banking, 200 I).
Meanwhi le, the abil ity to qui ckl y convert hi gh-rate, hi gh-risk loan s into nea rl y instant
profits has turned even the ri skiest borro wers into potential gold mines (Lord , 2005).
And thus, wid espread subprim e lending was born.
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Most subprimc lenders are nonbank institutions or bank subsidi aries (Enge l &
McCoy, 2002). Legitimate subprim e lenders tail or thei r loans to those borrowers deemed
1·iskie r bec ause of short or tarni shed credit hi stori es (Enge l & McCoy). Smith and
lmm crgluck (2004) found that th e forec los ure rate in the su bprime mark et is 20 tim es
higher than in the prime mark et, ren ectin g at least in part the increased ri sk in ess of th e
ma rk et and need fo r increased costs (Engel & McCoy). To hedge agai nst th e increased
risk o f these loans, subprim e lenders generall y charge hi gher rates than prim e lend ers, but
th e charges close ly re nect the credit ri sk of each particul ar borrower (Engel and McCoy).

Prerf(I{Orl' Markel

Though red lining is now ill ega l, bank s co ntinu e to shy away from se rvin g lowin co me, min ority, single wo men, and elderly hou seho lds, and instead set up subprim c
branches or subsidiari es to serve them (Lord , 2005). Nondepository in stituti ons whi ch
arc not assoc iated wit h bank s also bui ld stores in th ese areas. Though these subprim e
branches are supposed to cover the basic lend ing need s in these areas, En ge l and McCoy
(200 I) reported that man y borrowers never approach a lending in stituti on of any kind
because th ey believe they lack necessary credenti als for a loan. Predatory lend ers can
th erefore actively so licit these neighborhood s wit h litt le or no competition from
legitim ate lend ers, in spite of exo rbit ant pri ces. Combine the lack of competiti on with
borrower naivety and a prim e target area for predatory loans is found . Predatory lending
is of co urse not limited only to areas fittin g thi s description, but acco rding to many
report s, pockets of rampant predatory lendin g often occur in them (Enge l & McCoy).
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In the sense that most victims of predatory loans are low-income, minorit y,
elderl y, si ngle female and have poor cred it, the prob lem of predatory lending is primari ly
a subprim e mark et ph enomenon (Enge l & McCoy, 2002). Predatory lend ers target
individua ls who are naYve, or not parti cul arl y fin anciall y savvy, and lack co nn ec ti ons to
th e prim e market (Engel & McCoy). Deception, unethi ca l procedures, and hard sell
tactics are used to trick and trap these borrowers into loans with hi gh fees and rates,
whi ch di sproportionatel y benefit the lend er, and harm the borrower (Enge l & McCoy).
It is not necessary, however, that a loan be subprim e in order to be predatory.
Sometimes obsc ure cases of predatory lendin g occ ur in th e prim e market, th ough the vast
maj orit y of predatory lending occ urs in th e rea lm of th e subprim e mark et (E nge l &
McCoy, 2002). Figure I depi cts th e relat ionship of predato ry lending among th e prim e
and subprim e markets, and also int rod uces th e co ncep t o f mort gage fraud whi ch is
subseq uen tl y di sc ussed. Fi gure I docs not represent acc urate market sizes but is meant
on ly to represent the overlapping characteristics of these markets.
Whi le prime and subprim e transacti ons genera ll y offer mutu al benefi t to th e
lenders and the buyers, predatory loans offe r disproportionate benefit to the lenders and
harm to the borrowers (E nge l & McCoy, 2002). In a very genera l sense any lend er can
be a predat ory lend er si mpl y by addin g excess ive fe es and int erest rat es to an oth erwise
mutuall y benetlc ial loan, or by excess ively or dece itfull y pu shin g a loan or loa n products
on a customer. The exact defi nitions of excess and deceit , however, have become th e rea l
roadblock in affectin g regulation, parti cularl y in the subprime market.
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Su bprim e
Mark et

Prim e
Market

Figure I . Overlap ping mark ets.

It is agreed that subprim c lend ers fill a parti cul ar niche in the lending industry.
They agree to lend to ri skier indi viduals as long as they are allowed ti er pri ce, or to
charge each borrower according to hi s/her ri sk iness. This can effective ly alter the cost o f
th e very same loan by thou sand s of do ll ars, depending on the individual. The rea l
diffi cult y in the subprim e market is de terminin g when a lender is simpl y charging rates to
cover potenti al losses, or excessively chargin g a customer, thu s turnin g th e loan into a
predatory one. According to th e 2000 HUD/Treasury report, th e differen ces ca n be
sli ght , but di sastrous (U.S. Departm ent of Housin g, 2000).
Predatory lendin g may in vo lve mortgage fraud schemes that contain so me type o f
materi al mi sstatement, misrepresent at ion, or omi ss ion relied upon by an underwriter,
lend er or borrower, to fu nd, insure, or purch ase a loan (Federal Bureau of In vesti gation,
2005). Perpetrators of mortgage fraud arc eith er ·' fra ud for profit" in sid ers, o r " fraud for
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housin g·· borrowers (Federal Bureau o f In vesti gation). Fraud-for-housing cases in volve a
borrower deliberatel y mi sstating income, empl oymen t, or other informati on for the
purpose of acquiring or mainta ining homeownership . The maj orit y of fraud-for-p rofit
cases in vo lve thi rd part y brok ers, or brok er netwo rk s (broker, apprai ser, att orn ey, titl e
compa ny, in specto r), who deliberat ely mi srepresent information to mort gage lend ers,
underw riters or borrowers fo r th e purpose of increasing their profits from a transac tion
(Federa l Bureau oflnvest igat ion). Predatory lending oft en invo lves fraud against
borrowe rs, but even when the lender or underwriter is the target of broker fraud , th e
borrower is nearl y always a secondary victim because their loans become overpri ced, and
undercollatera li zed, leadin g to hi gh monthl y payments, less chance of refinanc ing, and a
hi gher t·isk of fo reclosure (E ngle & McCoy, 2002 ).
There is no lin e between mortgage fraud and predatory mortgage lending beca use
they often ove rl ap (as referenced in Fi gure I; Enge l & McCoy, 2002; Federa l Bu rea u of
Investigation , 2005). In many instances a broker could be in volved in bot h preda tory
lending and fraud. For exa mpl e, a broker who co ntacts a homeowner facing foreclosure
offers to refinance. Th e home is actuall y worth $60,000 but unbek nownst to th e
borrower, the broker fill s in th e paper wo rk claiming th e house to be worth $ 100,000.
Th e broker th en turns in th e paper wo rk to th e lendi ng co mpany that pays th e hi ghest
commi ss ion on the loan , and th e loa n is approved. Both the lender3 and th e borrower are
victimi zed, whil e the broker receives a larger com mi ssion from the inn ated pri ce of the
home. The borrower is left with monthly payments she can' t afford, and the lenders have
1

While it is possible that the lender ;mel th e brok er C<lll be from the same co mpany, more and more
loan s each ycJr are being arranged by tnd epend('nt brokers who have little vesttd lllh.'l"l'SI in th e

long term stabilit y of the lending companil·s.
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litt le co ll atera l from whi ch to rega in their in vestm ent when the borrower ca n' t pay
(Federal Bureau of Inves ti gati on). Actu al fraud is not necessary for a loan to be
considered predatory, but th e act of fraud again st a borrower is a suffi cient reason to label
a loan as such (E ngel & McCoy).

Characteri sti cs of Predatory Mortgage Lendin g

Predatory lending is a business of ol icitati on. Beca use th eir term s are generall y
unfair, and da magin g. they arc not li ke ly to be very competiti ve in th e traditional
mo rtgage lendin g mark et. Therefore, predatory lend ers do not wa it for borro wers to
co me loo king fo r th em; rath er, th ey acti vel y search th e mark et for vuln erab le borrowers.
The ideal custom er fo r a predatory lender is someone who has done li ttl e or no shopping,
has pres upposed th at bec ause of littl e or damaged credit that they can not qualify for a
loa n, and has signifi cant amount s of equ ity already bu il t up in th eir home. It is not
necessary th at a customer fit all these criteri a, but such customers are ofi cn clustered in
certain areas, such as low-income, minority, and agin g neighborhoods. Strategica ll y
placed billboards, ad vert isin g in the predominant neighborhood language, and telephone
and doo r-to-door solic it ati ons are some o f th e more pop ul ar mark et ing tec hni qu es
emp loyed. Once at the doo r, a comb inatio n of hard- se ll tactics, fri endlin ess, and an aura
of success lead the custom er to co mmit to contracts and believe th at th e lend ers have
their int erest at heart (Lord , 2005).
The majorit y of predatory lendin g occ urs as refin ancings and home equit y loans,
as opposed to o ri ginal hom e purchases (Quercia, Stegman, & Davis, 2004). On e of th e
main eli ffcrences between these two types of loan s is the amount of equit y th e borrower
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already has in their home. Predatory lenders often exploit this eq uity by engaging in
asset-based lending practices (Engel & McCoy, 2002). Loans without regard for th e
bo rrowe r's abilit y to pay seem to be aga inst th e lend er' s best interest beca use of costly
forec los ures, and the loss of earn in gs fro m reg ul ar monthl y payments in the event o f a
fo rec los ure. When examin ed closely, however, it is ev ident that lenders still ga in through
eq uity strippin g. In fac t, equ it y stri pp in g is o ne o f th e quickest methods a lender ca n
realiLc large profits (Engel & McCoy).
In genera l, equit y stripp ing occurs when a lender qualifi es a borrower for monthl y
payment s in excess of30-50% of their monthl y income, depending on other financial
obli ga ti ons (E nge l & McCoy, 2002). Th ere are even some docum ented in stances of
lend ers requir ing monthl y payment s on a loa n in excess of I 00% of the bo rrower's
mont hl y inco me (Lord , 2005). Nea rl y all of these loa ns soo ner or later exceed th e
bo rrower' s capac it y of paymen t and the borrower wi ll default on the loa n. With defau lts
come late fees, a so urce of profit for lenders, but more im portant ly, an opportu nit y to
offer another refinancing package. The sa me lend er wi ll then approach th e borrower and
offer to help them avo id forec los ure by refin anci ng. This new loa n package will usually
include a slightl y reduced interest rate, appea rin g to make the monthl y pa yment s more
afford able. But fees for end in g th e origin al loa n, and fe es for process in g the new loa n are
usually so large that they wi ll usually offse t any sav ings that mi ght have been rea lized
through a red uced interest rate (Engel & McCoy). A portion of the fees are th en stripped
fro m the equ ity in the home, and any remaining unpaid fees are ro ll ed into th e loan
principle and incur interest over the li fe of th e loan (Engel & McCoy).
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Spcci fi e Practi ces

As prev ious ly ex pl ai ned, predatory lendin g cannot be explained so lely by a li st of
~g rcg i o u s

practices because preda tory lendin g is also a function of ci rcum stances.

Therefo re th e follo win g li st is not a co mprehensive ex planation of predatory mort gage
lendin g, but rath er a li st of the more co mmon practi ces that are used in co njuncti on wi th
vu lnerab le borrower circ um stances.

Flipping

Flipp ing is the repeated refinancin g ora borrower's loans (Lord, 2005; U. S.
Depa rtm en t ofl-lousing, 2000). Because prepayment penal ti es, open in g, and clos in g
cos ts can easil y outweigh th e benefit s o r a reduced int erest rate, th e borrow er is often left
wo rse ofTa lie r repeated refinan cing, hav in g had equit y stripp ed from the home each tim e
(Lord; U.S . Department of Housing).

/Jalloon Paym e//[s//1/[erest-On~)l Loans

Ball oon payment s are des igned to lower th e month ly payment s of th e borrower.
Oft en th e bo rrower's monthl y paymen ts are o nl y hi gh enough to cover th e int erest on th e
loan, and in ex treme cases th e monthl y payment s do not even cover th e int erest, leading
to nega ti ve amorti zation. Aft er payin g for 15 or 30 years on a loan, th e borrower will
find th at th e fin al paymen t is the origina l borrowed amo un t or more, or in other wo rds,
the ent ire principal of the loan is still due. Often th e onl y way a borrower can pay a
balloon payment is by getting another loan (E nge l & lcCoy, 2002 ; Lord, 2005; U.
Departm ent of Hous in g, 2000).
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Prepay111ent Penalties
Acco rding to Farris and Richard so n (2004), on ly about 2% of co nform in g, or
prim e loans have prepaymen t penalties, whil e 70% ofsubprim e loans have them.
Trad iti onall y, a prepayment penall y is des igned to hedge against th e ri sk of th e borrower
refinanc in g a loa n in the first few years of th e loan, which reduces the amount o f profit
the lender makes from th e transaction over th e long run (Farri s & Ri chardso n). Th e
I nd ers would offer reduced interest rates if th e borrower entered illlo a prepayment
penalt y com ract. However, the majorit y of loans with prepaymelll pena lti es, accordi ng to
Farris and Richardson, actuall y had hi gher int erest rates than loans without th em.

l'11cking
With packing, borrowers are often so ld ex tra loan products or charged fees
witho ut th ei r know ledge or consent. The fees are then rolled into the loan and fin anced,
effectively increasi ng the monthl y payment s of the borrower. ll is often because of thi s
action that borrowers are quoted a much lower mon thly payment onl y to later find their
monthl y payments as much as two times hi gher (U.S. Department of Housin g, 2000).

Excessi ve Fees

Th e HUD/Treasury report (U.S Departm ent o f Housing, 2000) sa id th at th e large
fees bei ng charged by so me subprim e lenders were not j usti fi ed by the credit ri sk of th eir
borrowers. Prepaymelll pena lti es in parti cu lar, whil e onl y one of the man y fees, were
sa id to be abusi ve because they strip equity from a home if the borrower chooses to
refinance or sell during the firs t years of a loan (Lord, 2005 ; U. S. Departm ent of
Housing, 2000 ).
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Lending /Vitlw ut Regard to t!te Borroll'er ·s
Ability to Repav
It is no t uncomm on for mon thl y payme nts o n a s ubprime loa n to exceed 50
percen t of th e borro wer's inco me ( Lord, 2005; U.S. Departm ent o f Ho usin g, 2000).
Mo nth ly pa ym e nt s on hom e loa ns arc enco ura ged not to exceed 30% or a borrowe r' s
inco me (Co lt on, 2003). Occu rrenc es we re documented by HUD in ves ti gators in whi ch
pa yments on a loan actuall y exceeded the borrower's total monthl y inco me (Lo rd; U.S .
Department of Hous ing). Brokers ga in qui ck cash from s uch scenarios through hi gh
upfront fees, a nd fast sec uritization of the loan, whi le in vestors in th e sec uriti es a re
pro tec ted from losses by di versificati on over tho usa nds of loan s, and th e actu a l ho uses
be ing used as co ll ateral (Lord; U.S. Departm ent of Housing).

Outright Fmud
The m ost common cases of fraud against the borrower in vo lve fa lsifi ca ti o n of a
borrower' s income or hom e va lue. T hi s can put bo rrowe rs in a precario us s ituati o n;
be ing unabl e to a fford th e loan , and unabl e to re finance because lenders wi ll shy away
fro m s uc h a large loan, w ith so littl e co ll ateral (Lo rd , 2005; U. S. Departm en t of Ho usin g,
2000).

Credil lnsum nce
C redit ins urance is designed to protec t th e lender in the event that the bo rrower
dies, becomes disab led, or unemployed (Lord , 2005). It has no inherelll be nefits for the
borrower ( Lord). Most other types of in s ura nce pay 65 to 85 cen ts in c lai ms for every
dollar o f in surance purchased, and the s ugges ted minimum payout by th e Na tio na l
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Associati on of Insurance Commi ssioners (NA IC) is 60 cent s for every dolla r (Lo rd). ln
2002 th e payo ut for the 22 1 credit hea lth and accident com pani es repo rtin g to

A IC

averaged a payo ut of on ly 49.4 cent s per dol lar (Lord). Additionall y in that same year
credit life in sura nce companies onl y paid 41 .5 ce nt s per dollar, a far cry from indu stry
norms (Lord). If these compani es had charged industry suggested rates th en co nsumers
wo uld have saved nearl y $800 milli on in 2002 (Lo rd). Man y cred it insurance co mpani es
are actual ly subsidiaries of the major mort gage lend ers (Lord).

Single Premium Credit fn snrance

Poli shed mortgage brokers are ab le to se ll singl e premium credit insurance .
Because a sin gle premium poli cy ca n be tho usands of dollars, the brok ers will o ffer to
linance it , or mi l th e premium int o th e rest o f th e loa n. In surance poli cies oft en las t on ly
5 years, but when financ ed, th e borrower pays interest on the policy through the li fe of
th e loa n. Someone entering a 30-year mort gage in 1975 wo uld only be covered until
1980 by hi s/her credit poli cy, but would be paying interest on thi s po li cy until 2005, we ll
beyond th e use of the poli cy (Lord , 2005).

Servicing

Bund les of loans are so ld from the ori gin al lend er to other in vesto rs. The job of
co ll ec ting monthl y payment s is th en given to a mortgage service co mpan y. Some
mort gage servicing compani es have pa rti cipated in predatory practices, such as failure to
post payments promptl y resulting in late fees for th e borrower; mi srepresenting the
amounts consum ers owed, and ; fai ling to make pa yments on propert y taxes and insurance
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fi·o m escrow account s, so metimes causi ng th e bo rrower to lose th eir ins ura nce o r even
thei r ho use beca use of past-due tax co ll ectio ns.

Other Ahuses
Acco rdi ng to Sturdeva nt and Brenn an ( 1999), oth er abuses ca n inc lud e rac ia l
targeting in adverti sing; loans in connect ion with a home improvement sca m; steering or

leadi ng bo rrowers to hi gh cost lenders; k ic kbac ks (paym ents) to th ird part y p layers
(broker, appraiser, ano rn ey, titl e co mpany, inspec tor) for steerin g bo rrowers to hi gh cost
loa ns; hi gh annual inte rest rat es; padd ed o r d up licative c losing costs and fees; mandato ry
arbit rati on c lau ses and assoc iated loss o f lega l rights; shi fting unsec ured de b t into
mort gages; and fo reclosure abu ses.

C harac te ri stics o f Bo rro wers

111i l the 1970s som e bank execut ives a ll egedl y drew red lines a ro und lowincome and mino rit y ne ighborhoods, d isco uraging brokers from lending mo ney in those
areas, a practi ce kn own as " red lin ing" ( Lo rd , 2005). The practice was o ffi c ia ll y e nd ed in
1973 w ith the passage o f the Home Mo rt gage Disc los ure and Communi ty Re in vestme nt
Ac ts, tho ug h in stances since co ntinu e to be doc umented (Lord) . Predatory le nders have
p ic ked up whe re th e banks le ft off, and have begun to "green- li ne" or ta rge t low-inco me,
an d m inority ne ighborhoods (Newman & Wy ly, 2002; Z im merma n, Wyly, & Bo te in,
2002).
A study inc ludin g 10 metropo litan areas fo und that concelllrati o ns o f s ubprim e
le nding were fo und accordi ng to d istributio ns o f e ld erl y and m ino ri ty popula tions, and
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not accord in g to cred it risk , indica tin g that those who were elderly or minority we re
much more lik ely to have a subprim c loan regardl ess of cred it score (Na tional
Co mmunity Rein vestment Coa lition, 2004). Severa l additional studi es have veri fied
th ese findin gs (Newman & Wyly, 2002; Zimm erman et al., 2002). Moreover, large
co nc entrat ions ofsubprim e lending ha ve been found in low-i ncom e neighbo rhood s
(Ca lcm. 1-i crshaff, & Wachter, 2004; Schill & Wachter, 1993 ; U.S. Department of
Housing, 2000). Farris and Ri chard son (2004) fou nd th at the li ke li hood of hav ing a
prepa yment penalty included in a loan was more hi ghl y co rrelated wi th rural and
minority hom eowners than wi th cred it ri sk.
Lenders have fo und a variety of ways in whi ch to find and ta rge t potenti al
bo rrowe rs who may be less ed ucated, lack ex peri ence with leg itim ate lend ers, li ve fa r
from legitimal e lenders, may lack adequate reso urces fo r shopping for loans such as a
telephone or transportatio n, have large amoun ts of equ ity in their homes, and are behind
on propert y taxes or in need of home repai rs (Enge l & McCoy, 2002). HMDA data
repo rts where prime lend ers operate (and do not operate) . Census data show the exact
location and percentages of minoriti es and income categories in neighborhoods. The tax
offi ce and deed reg istry shows who is close to paying off their mortgages, and th ose
de li nqu ent on property ta xes. Anoth er, commo n meth od used by home imp rovement
seammers is to simp ly dri ve by poorer neighborhoods in search o f houses with obviou s
needs for improvement on th e ex teri or, and then offer these homeown ers a homeimprovement loan, of co urse wi th hi gh and hidd en costs (Engel & McCoy).
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Lending Factors

Alain Sn·ee/ Lenders

It is estimated that brokers handl e about half of all mortgage loa ns (S enate
Co mmittee on Banking, 200 I). Brokers ha ve in centives to steer bo rrowers to lenders that
pay brokers the most rather than to lend ers who give borrowers the most fa vo rab le term s
(Senate Committee on Banking). In addition to brokers; lenders, real estate developers,
and rea l estate agen ts are often paid a co mmi ssion based on the value of the loans they
sec ure ( at ion al Community Reinvestment Coa liti on, 2005). Appraisers a! o get
dragged in to th e mix and can face ex treme amount s of press ure to deli ver overstated
values (National Co mmunit y Rein vestm ent Coa liti on). Appraisers who do not deli ver th e
so ught afte r·, overstated va lues are oft en withhe ld paymen ts, threatened with loss of
bu siness, and are sometimes even blacklisted by lenders. Lend ers have also been known
to ·'shop aro und " for apprai sers for eac h propert y, choosing the one that gives the hi ghest
pri ce estimate ( ational Com munity Rein vestm en t Coa liti on). Whether actual co llu sion
among mortgage market profess ional s is voluntary or forced is not as rel evant as the mere
recognition that incenti ves between actors in the market often leads th em to pursue
ac ti vities that are not in the best interest o f the borrowers.

Wall S11·ee1 Lenders

Table one shows that predatory lending is not an iso lated ph enomeno n, but
in stead is a widespread failure in the mort gage market. Wall Street firm s co nt inue to
directl y and indirectl y support predatory practices. Conseco Financial (G reen Tree), for
exa mpl e, wo uld not have been ab le to ca rry o ut its injurious practices wi thout the backing
of so me big Wall Street names.

ix in surance and mutu al fu nd (i nvestment) compani es

25
were the main purchasers of Co nseco mor1gage backed securities at the time of its $2 7
milli on seul emenl: Denver based Great-West Life & Annuity In su rance Co., Japan based
Nippon Li fe In surance, L.A. based Met West Financial , Boston based John Hancock
Financial Serv ices, Iowa based PFL Life Insurance, and Pittsb urg based Me ll on Financ ial
Corp (Lord , 2005). Given the tendenc y of in vestment corporati ons to make in formed
in vestm ent decisions, it is reaso nabl e to ass ume that Co nseco's widel y critici zed lending
practices were wel l known to th ese in vestors who made the decisi on to purchase shares of
th e sec urities any\\ ay, ba sed not on mo ral perspect ive but on alluring potenti al returns.
Ironi ca ll y, it is conceivable th at those who were injuri ously overcharged by Co nseco
were also ow ners of life insurance polici es, o r mutual fund investments mad e in the
above nam ed co mpanies and th erefore ma y have indirectl y financed their ow n thi eves.
An int eresting note is that the settl ements IJ·om Househo ld Financial and the
Associa tes are the largest non- tobacco cons umer sett lements in hi story. Also worth note
is that despite the large total of the settl ements, the compensation to individual victim s is
still far from adequate for even coverin g the losses they incurred from lendin g abu ses,
and arc fa r fro m innicting any puniti ve or di sc iplinary costs to the compa ni e (ACORN ,
2003).

Summary

Because predatory mortgage lending is a relative ly new phenom enon, and the
probl em itse lf is so broad and undefined , on ly a handful of academic resea rch arti cles on
the topic exist (Ca lem et al. , 2004; Elliehausen & Staten, 2002, 2003; Harvey & Nigro,
2002; Hoga rth & Hilgert, 2002; Lax, Manti , Raca, & Zom, 2004; Morgan Stanley,
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Tab le I
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South l-lnanewl
(lroup

Ddt:r hmdmg
Cuql

Delta l·mancial

$12 million

2002

('m-p

l · n ·~ t 1\ lli:m r.:c
/l.lurtgag\! C'o

Fir~ I i\
('Np .

lliancc

Asscb
liquidated
($60 million)

Promised to no longer da:.niminott' bct\\ecn
boJiO\\CrS. !o stop the payment ofuncamcd bro!-er
n:cs, aud to cease lcndmg to persons who cannot
:tt1'11nl puymen ts
Company liletl ,.ur bankruptcy :md lrq uidated it s
:tssets. CEO's prohibited from fuwrc mortgage
lending in 6 states and lined $20 tni llion

(Federal Rcsen e
Ibn!. ofC'htcago.
2003)
(Yeomans. 200 I)

I ill' .'\.-,~liCtilh:~
(n:narnctl
Ctulm:nu:ial

('tltg.mup Inc

5240 million

Salo practices und prtKILKIS 11n.: now clost:ly

( 'nrp

Mcrl·:Jntik

l 'rnhtCn-J
tirt·o.:n ln:c

(I he la rgest
tinancwl
company mthe
''urld)
Con~ecu Inc .

HSB(' (iroup

S-U~4

II.SIJ(' Group

$100 rmllion

I airbanh.::.

I'M I Group Inc

$40 million

Prom1~cd not to nttkc loath to people ''ho couldn't
animlthern. not to dKmge Juan term!> <II closing. not
t\1 inchuk b<~llnon paymetlh m home equtty loans.
not ltl ,·nmll '''P~'Ibl\ c lll'>UI':tlll'~· pulicic:, into lo;m.,
Nn ~·r adml\tcd 111 :til) predator) :~t·t•ons
Dcn11.:d any 111\ohern..:ntm pro.:<latory lcndmg !'he
large!!\ non-tobnct:n consumer :,ettkment Ill history
Implementation of home forcclosurt• a\oidancc
progr::m1. LO\\cr intcMl rates. wai'c late charges.
defer unpaid tlllcrc:,t ond tlmd a linancial counseling
J>rogr<..trn tOr boriO\\Ct;, at ns~ of iOn:closurc
Ad mined no wrongdomg

\Vi.:ll~

Wel ls

$750.000

Arter years ofprcssun; :llld bud publicity, Wclb l1 as
t:tkcn :tctions to n;du~.:c certain pr~·datory k:tturcs
t'rornlouns. These a~.: lions have been criticized by
m:1ny :.b mere fanlhrc . "1\h many prJctices
conunutng tlllh1ndcred
1\grced to no longer ~d l hon'll.'-basetlloans

$27 Mrlhon

liiii:OO.Xll

lm:mt·ral)

mtllmn

lmatll'..:Cnq>
llllU~Chold
Fuwn~.:cCorp

Fargo

lrll:lllCI:JI

F:~rgo

I bn~

( ':tt>rtal Cll)
Mortgage Coil>.
IA:ht \\'or\..~

$170 mrllion

Inc.
;\ rlltTHf lh::.t

Mongagl.'
ABN AMRO

t\CCCapitnl
Jtoldmgs C'01p.
1\BN J\MRO

\l tu·tgagt·

Murtgag~·

W::hlmlgton

Group
\\a'>hington
\lutuallm:

\lutu;.~llmann:

litutll

2002

{Fcdcru l Tr:rtk
Co tnm .. 2002)

1001

(I

2002

(1 onl. 2005)

2002

(Lord. 200.5)

2002

(Oklahoma
C'on!!UillCr b~ues
Update. 2003)

unl.1005)

momtorcd by the FTC Largest consurncr protect ton
\enhct to dat,·.

(fl'll:lllll.'d

Jlou'>t:huld

2002)

$325 million
SJ million
(proposed)

Filcd tOr bankn•ptcy. "ith as:.cts being liquidated
and d1spcrsed
t:\ cr adrmth.:d any\\ rongdoing.
Denied all allegat ions but agreed to change
t'umlamcntal practit·es.
Plamtiffs arc a:.k ing lOr increased regulation on
predatory lcndmg acti' 111c~. 111 addit1on to payments

2003

( Lord. 2005)

2005

(D inncn, 2005)

2005

2005
2006
pending

( Fic1~hman.

2005)
(Federal Tr..tlk
C'omm .. 2005)
(Downey. 2000)
(Con:,umct
Educa11011. 2005)

ofd:~magc:. .

$7 rnrllrun
(proposed)

If class at·uon .sur! i~ :.u~.:re~~lltl. :til t·ustomcrs lose
thl.'ll' rights tu -.c~·~ t'unher punl\1\t' damagt·s

pcndmg

(Trw! La\\}er.-.
tOr l'ublil' Jusucc.

11.105)
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2002; Querc ia. Stegman & Dav is, 2003, 2004; Stein, 200 I). Man y of these stud ies have
limi ted scopes that do not adequately cover all features of predatory lending, bu t focus
in stead on very limited and in co mpl ete features. This is not to say th at these studi es are
use less; in fa ct th ey have furth ered th e accep tan ce of the reality oC predatory lendin g to
th e point ofinnu encing some stat e and fed eral regulations. However, confu sion still
loo ms amo ng regulators, industry lenders, and even eo nsumers on what exac tl y predatory
lending ent ai Is. Thi s research will enable predatory lending in Utah to be understood
through expert opinions of those who regul arl y witn ess predatory lending and its effects,
first hand .
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CHAPT ER Ill
METHODS

Th e Qua litative Research Paradigm

The core goa l of thi s research was to defin e predatory mortgage lending acco rdin g
to the und erstandings of home loan professionals for the purposes of future educatio n and
regul ati on. Beca use views and und erstand in gs of the topi c were ex pec ted to be diverse,
and so mewhat unpredictable, a more nat uralist, or qualitati ve approac h was appropriate
(Rubin & Ru bin, 2005). Th is research was also facilit ated by a detailed log of decisions
mad e throughout the researc h process, includin g rencc ti ve thoughts of th e principal
in vesti gat or, as co nsistent with th e qualit ati ve ap proach desc ribed by Cres well (2003) and

Rossman and Rallis (2003). Parti cularl y during th e in terviews, thi s approac h was use ful
for capturing highli ghts, nonverba l evi dence, and initia l emergence o f impo rtant concepts
and themes. Addi tionall y, an assistant researcher with previous ex perience in qualitati ve
stu dies also served as second eva lua tor fo r th e purpose of triangul ati on and verification
throughout the research process (Rossman & Ralli s).
Co nsistent wi th the modern qual itati ve approach (Creswe ll , 2003), th e dat a
co ll ected from th e interviews were not limit ed to verbal respon ses, but also inclu ded
vo ice inn cc ti o ns and non verbal cues, as we ll as persona l record s, releva nt documents,
cmail s. and so fo rth , as exp lain ed later in th e data co ll ection procedures. Interviews were
also co nducted in the interviewee's natural setti ng as suggested by Creswe ll , meaning
tha t the mortgage lend in g profess iona ls were ask ed to choose the locati on of the
int ervi ew. All part icipant s chose their prim ary place of busi ness, or a simila r selling.
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Creswel l di sc ussed that ad vantages of the natu ra l setting inclu de th e abi lit y for the
resea rcher to witness hi gh levels of detail about the interviewee's environ ment and all ows
th e researche r to become highl y in vo lved in th e interviewee's dail y ex peri ences. The
prim ary role of th e researcher wa s to guid e th e interview between each main qu esti on
using fo ll ow- up questi ons and probes, a meth od of int erviewing th at is disc ussed later.

Unit of In vesti gati on

Mortgage lendin g pro fess ionals are arguabl y th e most know ledgeab le peop le
ava il abl e to assist with the und erstanding of predatory mortgage lendin g. Intuiti ve ly,
mortgage pro fess ionals deal with mort gage borrowers and lenders on a regul ar, fu ll -ti me
basis, and th erefore, are in a positi on to witn ess their dail y interac ti ons, dea ls, and

cli sagrccmcnts. A mortgage lending professional ca n be loosel y defined as an y person
whose ca reer requires regular, full -time cont ac t with either mo rtgage borrowers,
mortgage lenders, or both . Dut ies of a mortgage lendin g pro fess ional range anywhere
from ed uca tion and cou nse li ng, to regulati on or business. Bec ause the pu rpose of thi s
research was to more acc urately defin e predatory lending as it currentl y ex ists in Utah,
th e unit of in vesti gation was the mort gage lending professional.

Sampl e and Rec ruitm ent

As opposed to large sca le surveys where quant ity and frequ ency of opinions are
sought (M organ Stanley, 2002), thi s study encouraged a detai led qualitati ve approach.
Eac h interviewed professional was encouraged to con tribute a signifi cant amount of
detail to hi s/her respon ses, so th at a ric hl y informati ve illustrati on o f notewo rth y detail s
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was poss ibl e. Th e se lec ti on o f part ic ipant s began with a prelimin ary list that was
co mpil ed by th e prim ary and ass istant researchers. This pre lim inary li st was suggested
by several professional acquain tances of th e resea rchers who had previously been
in vo lved wi th some of th e groundwork for thi s project. Those officials who participat ed
initiall y were asked to id entify other potenti al parti cipants who co uld offer additional
insight s about predatory mortgage lend ing. These suggesti ons compri sed the remaind er
of th e samp le. Thi s method of sam plin g is known as snowball , or chain sampling and has
been used in many qualitati ve studi es li ke this one (Pallon, 2002). Specia l effort was
made to includ e equal sampl es o f participants with predisposit ions for co nsumer
advocacy, industry advocacy, or neutrality such as regulators.
Int erviewees were initiall y co nt ac ted by phon e or email , at whi ch tim e th e

primary resea rcher gave his name. uni versity association, and ex pl ai ned th e top ic of the
int erview. The primary resea rcher th en asked fo r an interview and ex pl ained th at because
of the nature o f the interview, the length wo uld be at th eir di screti on, but wou ld likely last
between 30 to 90 minutes. At that tim e incent ives for participation were also ment ioned
as described in the followin g paragraph .
Beca use of the prim ary resea rcher's previous ex peri ence with those in th e
mortgage lendin g market, it was anti cipated th at the vast majo rity o f the samp le wo uld
part icipate with few or no incenti ves. Nevert heless, the pa1ticipants were offered a
perso nal copy of the final proj ect as an incentive for th eir participat ion. Additionall y, the
primary in vestigato r offered to share hi ghli ghts of th e project in classes and work shops
through whi ch associates of the partici pant s may also benefit from thi s research.
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Wh en an agreement to pa rti cipate was given, a time and a pl ace for the interview
was th en determ ined by the interviewee. At th e ti me of th e interview, each parti cipan t
was aga in informed of the purpose of the stud y, poss ible adverse effects of participati on,
and th eir ri ght s to withdraw or withh old information. They were also as ked to sign th e
Institu ti onal Rev iew Boa rd ( IRB) approved inform ed consent form as an
acknowledgment o f thei r dec ision to continu e wi th the interview (sec Appendix A).
The fin al sampl e included 12 fu ll-time professional s who wo rk in Utah, and who
were chosen wi thout geographi cal preference. Although most of the interviewees were
co ncen tra ted along the Wasatch Front, many have had ex periences wo rking all over the
state. The final sample inc lud ed four co nsumer advocates, fou r indu stry advoca tes and
fo ur neutral parti cipants who have 182 years of co ll ec ti ve experience in nearl y every

co nceivabl e Rrea of the mortgage lendi ng market. Consumer advocates have had
prev ious ex pe rience in banking, rea l estate lending, and as loan officers, ed ucators,
co unse lors and para lega ls. Indu stry advocat es have past ex peri ences as lawyers, state
managers, regio nal man agers, loa n o ffi cers, ow ners, sa les managers, branch managers,

nat ional sa les directors, managers of ho me sa les, and spec ial assets managers. Neutral
pm·ticipant s have ex periences as mort gage brokers, app raisers, rea l estate brok ers, asset
mana gers, non-profit work ers, bank ers, lawyers, loan officers, co mmunit y deve lopers,
litir housin g wo rkers, regul ators, and edu ca tors. Tab le two gives furth er desc ripti ve
dctai Is about the parti ci pants.
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Tab le 2
ll esponde111 Characteristics (n = 12)
Predisposition
Consu111er i/dvocotes

lndusuy Advocmes

N wnha

4

4

4

Mole

I

4

2

Fe111ale

3

0

2

8

13

24

Al/ean years of
experience

Neutral Poniciponts

Data Col lec ti on Procedures

Whil e obtaining the proper signature on th e IRB approved inform ed co nsent form
and during th e co urse of th e int erview, the primary researcher engaged in initi al
assessments of th e charac teri sti cs of th e int erv iewee and hi s/her surroundin gs, including
the in terviewee's gend er, genera l age, nature of their place of' emp loymen t (large, small ,
pub li c, private), and other envi ronm en tal qua lit ies (busy, many coworkers, etc.). Next,
the in terview questi ons co mmenced (see Appendi x B).

Follow-ups and Probes

In qualita ti ve interviews, fol low- up quest ions are used to ex plore themes,
co ncepts, and ideas introduced by th e int erviewee (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). Probes are
used as subt le co mmuni cati ons whi ch ask for more detail , or furth er clarifi cati on of
prev ious statements (Rubin & Rubin). Fo llow-up and probing questions were
incorpo rated into the interviews but were not scri pted because they were used to clarify
and ex pand on co mments made durin g the interv iew, and we re therefo re not foreseeable.
Exa mples of follow-up question s inc luded: ''Cou ld yo u te ll me more about what you j ust
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sa id ?" or "W hat did yo u mean by that ?" or " Wh y is that important?" Simi larl y, probes
\\'Crc used to indicate for th e interv iewee to continue, and keep th e interview moving.
Ex ampl es of probes were, ··oK," " I see," "'That 's interesti ng," and someti mes even
inc luded nonverbal cues such as a nod of the head or lift of th e eyebrows. The general
in tent of probes was to show th e interviewee that what he/she is saying is of va lue and for
subtl e encouragement to continu e (Rubin & Rub in).

Pilot illlerl'iews

Two pilot interviews were conducted with the iment of refi ning th e interview
questions. The purpose of these interviews was to clarify any confusi ng wordi ng in the
questi on s, and to determin e th e effecti veness of th e qu estions for ex tract in g a use ful
meaning of" predatory lending in Uwh. Feedback from these participants se rved as a
verifi cati on of th e reli ab ility and va lidit y of the intervi ew questions by help ing to ensure
unbiased wording in the main questions. Accordin g to these initial participants the main
question s effectivel y served their purpose of defining and describing predatory mortgage
lending, and th e wording did not require any alteration.

Procedures

The participant s were int erv iewed by using th e tree and branch method. The tree
and branch method desc ribed by Rubin and Rubin (2005) began wi th th e main research
topic: predatory mortgage lendin g in Utah. Thi s topi c was then ex plored using seven
main qu es tion s and subsequent follow-up s and probes. The result was an array of
comments that branch from the seven main questi ons, all of which stem from or describe
the main topic . The direction, nature and con telll of the responses were thu s determin ed

34

by th e int erviewees wh il e ens uring a thorough covering of the main resea rch topic (Rubi n
& Rubin).
Four types of data co llection are common in qualitati ve research: observa ti on,
interviews, documents, and audi ov isual material s (C reswe ll , 2003). The prima ry mode of
investigation in th is research was through the int erv iew ing of parti cipan ts as desc ribed
previous ly; however, observations, documents, and oth er ev id ence were also used when
offered by the interviewees. Because all of the int erviews took place at the parti ci pant 's
place of empl oyment, observat ion of th eir env ironment and interac ti ons we re eas il y
ob tai ned. Likew ise, during the course of the interviews, some participants offered the
resea rcher documents such as addit ional lit erature, offic ial reports, leuers and emai ls, as
ev id ence o r a certain point, and these were used in th e final ana lysis. It is wo rth notin g

that thi s type or infonnation was not solicited during the interviews, but was included as
ev idence on ly when offered at the intervi ewees' own initiati ves.

Data Recording Proced ures

Fo r th e interview, the researcher's no tes were divided down the middl e of the
page, with one sid e con tainin g key wo rd s and phrases made by th e int erviewee, and th e
oth er side co ntainin g th e resea rcher's perso nal tho ught s and re nect ive no tes.
Observatio ns of actions and ex press ion s of the interviewee, notes on the environm en t,
and other occurrences were also included in the re nective notes. The co lumns for the
interv iew and renect ive notes were paral lel, ma intai ning a chronological now of
co mments and ideas as they came, wh il e retai nin g a separation of the resea rcher's notes
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from what was actuall y sa id by the intervi ewee. Interviews were also aud io recorded,
and tran scrib ed into text for furth er ana lys is, whi ch is described in th e nex t secti on.

Data Ana lys is Procedures

A II th e intervi ews were transcribed int o text from their audi o vers ions. As a
check for maintaining cred ibility of the interviews, th e transcribed co pi es o f the
int erviews were sent to each respec ti ve int erviewee via postal mail or email. The
in terviewees th en had a chance to co rrect, add to, or otherwise change the content of thei r
int erviews, thus serving as a '"member check"' of reli ab ility.
Th e interviews and not es were th en read throu gh initiall y to glea n th e overall
meaning o f th e data co ll ectively. Not es and re nec tivc thoughts were written in the
margin s fo r subsequent use. Nex t, general coding of th e data bega n through labeli ng of
sections of the material by topic . To be co nsistent with the id eas of th e int erviewees, th e
labe ls were often terms suppli ed by them during th e intervi ews, and not term s imposed
by th e resea rcher; these are call ed "i n vivo" codes. Each interview was trea ted on a more
indi vidu al bas is in thi s step. As an addi ti onal step of ensuring reli ability. thi s step of
labeling was a lso preform ed by both the primary resea rcher and the assistant researcher
fo r purposes of co mparing co nsistency and log ica lity of labelin g. No maj or or persistent
inco nsistencies were found; th erefore, th e primary resea rcher coded the rest of the data
alone.
Topics were then grouped together and organi zed into three major categories:
co mm ent s on a defin it ion, comm ent s on a descri pti on, and ot her informati on. Content of
the major catego ries was th en divid ed into several descripti ve categories. Th e materi al

36
11

as then reread; this time th e researc her added more speci fie codes fo r th e material in th e

descripti ve categories. The intervi ews at thi s point were treated co ll ecti vely, meani ng
tha t there was littl e recogniti on as to who th e authors of th e comm ents were, but ra ther
eac h quote was treated for meanin g, and not for it s so urce of ori gin. Th e relating nature
of the quotes helped to organi ze the supportin g ev idence into a signifi ca nt desc ripti on of
major and minor concepts that make up predatory mortgage lending. Th e codes were
then organized into a narrative or description of predatory lending as su pported by th e
ev idence in chapter four. This met hod of man aging qualitati ve data was pe rformed on
NVivo7, a co mputer softwa re program designed for the puqJose o f analyz ing qualitative
data (QS R Intern ationa l, 2005). Thi s so ft ware pro ved to be user fri end ly and more tim e
effi cient than th e traditional fold er method. In the narrative, th e majo r find ings we re
supported by mu ltipl e or longer, more det ailed quo tes, whi le uniqu e perspec ti ves were
suppo rt ed by on ly one or two less deta il ed co mment s. A detai led descripti o n of the
chronologica l protocol of thi s inves ti ga ti on is dep icted in Table 3.
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Table 3

The Successive Phases oji11e Investigation
SteJ

Phase I

Prcparatron

Obtain Oackground

Through a thorough investigation ofacadcmrc li terature, and a
conwwcd monrtoring ofcurrcm events for the post two years, the
primary researcher has acquired an inforrn~d background on the

Form the Interview

Main interview questions and guide lines h:l\ c been constructed
from relevant literature.

topi c of preda tory mortgage lendin g

Locate Potential
J n(('fVIC\\

Phase II - Appro, a!

Ph~r s l'

Ill

Pdu1

lll\('1'\t('\\ S

Phase Il l Data
Collection

The Institutional Review Board (IRO) apprO\ed the study to ensure

Cornmrllcc Appro' al

that the nght s of human participants mthc study "ere protected.
The members of the research cormmttcc approved thr s research.

Obtarn 2 rnirial
llllti'\IC\\ S

Refining intcn rew
guest ions
Interviewees
Contacted
Meet for Int erview
Audio Reco rd er
Interview
Introduction
JRB Rights
Research Question s
Notes

Phase IV
An<l lys rs

Dat~l

Transcription
Revic\\

Toprcs l>rbcled
Org:mi;c toprcs
Categori es
Add codes

Evidence
Discussion
Ph;.~ sc

V

Fmdin~ s

Rtporl

A preliminary li st ofpotcntii:ll interviewees has been formed .

CCS

IRB Appr01al

Report findm gs.

fhl' purpOSl' of1hesc in11inl in1crvicws \\<IS for ICS!ing the interview
lOr conlcnt and re li abilit y.
Feedback ''as obtarncd fromlhcsc particip~mt s on lhC' usefulness
and Cl<rrll)' Of the IIIICT\ IC\\ questiOnS.
The intcrvrew qucstrons did no1 need to be adjustt.x! or refined based
on feedback of the initial panicipants.
The first several interviewees were contacted. l'Xplained the purpose
of the s1udy and asked for an interview.
Mee tings were hl•ld at locatr ons specified by th e interviewees.
The audio reco rder was used
Interviewees again had the purpose of the Stlrd y rc>rd to them.
quc ~ lron s

lntcn rewees had thei r righ ts as hurnm subjecrs read to them
includmg the nght to withdraw at any 11111e.
The rcsc;.~rch ques1ions were asked alon g with follow·up and
probing questions.
1otes \'-'ere 1aken to record thoughts and renections of the
researcher dur in ~ the course of the interview.
The imcrvicws were transcribed from th e audio t<Jpes into text and
put into fO lders.
The interview teus and notes were ini tially reviewed for gcner:tl
meanings ::rnd nature of responses.
Tht• mtcrviews ;.~nd notes \\ere again rc~1d to c;.~p!Ure the major
IOJ>I CS.
lrH.ll\t tlu:tlrrHen rl'\\ S rc\e<.Eied rmponant topics '' hrch address tht·
m~un research CJltestions and these topics were labck'd
Top res organi;ed co ncep tuctlly using NVivo7 l'Onlputcr soH war~·
Descriptive ca tegories were formed out oft he top1c rml\criul.
Material w;.~ s reread ;:~nd the c<:~tcgory codes were ;JSSigned to
subsections oft he interviews, some times more than one category
w<Js used for each subsection depending on the interrel~uion of
concepts.
The dcfini1ion ofprcdntory mortgage lending yielded itself from the
major and minor supponing ev idence from the intcrviC\\ S.
The findings will be discussed in light of lit cra\Urc and the new
evidence.
The findin gs of the rcse<.~rch will be reponed in a thesis project,
Jc;.~demic :.~rucles. <
.rnd 3 report to the Utah Dt vision of Rc;.~ l Eswre.
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CHAPT ER IV
RESU LTS

The result s are presented in th e sa me ord er as the study's obj ecti ves foun d at the
end of chapt er one. Thi s co nceptu al organi za tion was not on ly support ed by th e lit erature
but also by the par-ti cipan ts of th is stud y. First, a de finiti on of predatory lendin g is
presented using th e words of th e ex pert pa nel. Nex t, descripti ve ev idence is presented
th at addresses obj ecti ves two through six. These includ e descriptions of the magnitud e of
predatory lend ing, factors and conditi ons that spur it s ex istence, practi ces that are
considered predatory, characteri sti cs o f victim s, and suggestions of ways to reduce it.
Ncar the end of th e chapt er there is an addi ti on al section that desc ribes th e co nsequ ences
of abu sive and predatory lendi ng, and whom it affects.

Resea rch Obj ecti ve On e: A Definition '

Ahusi•'e Le11di11g

··There is a fine line between th e pract ice and abusing th e pract ice,'' bega n a
preda tory lending spec iali st. But when par-t icipant s were asked the definiti o n of abu sive
lend ing it bec am e appare nt that the lin e was not so fin e after all. Simi lar to current
literature, many oft he par-ti cipant s bega n definin g abusive lendi ng by li sting prac ti ces
that they co ns idered abusive. A consum er ad vocate described, " It 's abu sive when peopl e
get taken adva ntage of and income changes. It 's also abu sive when they prey upon the
elderl y and the un educated, with high repayment term s in gen eral. "

~ S~t:' App('ndi .x C fOr diagram

or cod ing sc lii.:rne for ('ach obj ec ti ve
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The chore of defin ing ab usive lendi ng became much more diffic uli by exc luding
th e ci tati on of specifi c practi ces; neverth eless, by pi ec ing together direct re ferences that
addressed abu sive lending, a finn definiti on was deri ved. Therefore, abusive lendin g
con sists of one or more of the following: (a) a tran sac tion without a fidu cia ry dut y or
hav in g th e borrower 's best int erest in mind , (b) a transaction the borrower does not
compl etely und erstand for any reason in cluding age, language barri er, or lac k of fin ancial
savvy, (c) an y transacti on that results in harm to the bOITower, (d ) any loan that deli vers
th e lender excess ive profit s, and (c) any loan th at the borrower does not have th e abilit y
to repay.
Th e definition is not perfect, but is a good starting point. On e probl em with thi s
defi nition is that it is so broad th at it may not be app licab le in every situatio n. For
exa mpl e, it is theoretica ll y poss ibl e for a lend er not to have the best int erest of the
borrowe r in mind , but still deli ver a loan that is entirely benefi cial to the bo rrowe r. A
seco nd prob lem is th at the definiti on is not meas urabl e. For exampl e, borrower
understandin g is not easil y measured and the refore one co uld never acc urately determin e
wheth er or not a borrower compl etely understood hi s or her loan tran sacti on. Imperfec t
as thi s defin ition may be, it still prov id es a use ful background for ana lyz in g predatory
lend ing.

?redmon• Lending
Si mil ar to desc ripti ons of abusive lending, parti cipants routin ely defin ed
predatory lending by ci ting speci fi c acts th at are predatory. One neutral parti cipant
related:
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Some attempts to define it, that we have seen include things like, " What was the
loan to va lue rat io? What was the percentage of inco me, as compa red to the
payment ? How many po iIlls above market rate is the person gett in g th e loan?"
Neverth eless, without ci tin g speci fi c acti vi ti es, parti cipants were ab le to
co ll ect ive ly de fin e predatory lending as one or more of the followin g: (a) un fa ir or
abusive lending practices that arc targeted toward s vulnerable borrowers; (b) preying on,
or taking adva ntage of borrower vu lnerabili ties; (c) excessive pro fit s from sing le loa ns;
and. (d) a loa n without logical benefit to the borrower. Part (a) of the definition refers
directly to the previously established definition of abusive lend ing. Parts (c) and (d) of
thi s definition also bear a striking resemb lance to the defin ition of abusive lending.
Preda tory lendin g is therefo re defined throu gh th e use of the defi niti on of abu sive
lending. In fac t, only one maj or difference seems to ex ist between them; namely, th e act
of' targetin g o r preyin g on indi vidual bo rrower vulnerabi liti es for predatory lend in g,
whereas ab usive lending include the same occu rrences, but without a defi ned target.
Further evidence to support this conclusio n is given by parti cipallls who directly
compa red ab usive and predatory lend ing.

Pret!a/OI)' Lending Versus Ahusive Lending

Half of th e parti cipa nt s ex pli cit ly made statement s similar to one made by a
co nsum er advocate that ''Abusive loans arc the sa me thing as predatory loans. Prett y
muc h one and the same." Thi s relationsh ip is depicted in Figure 2. Oth er partic ipan ts
described an overlapp in g order simi lar to the following idea shared by an indu st ry
advocate, "In the realm of things you've got all lendi ng, and then you've got abus ive
lendi ng and then yo u have ... predato ry." Th is re lation ship is shown in Fig ure 3.

41

Thou gh supported by many sources, th e overl ap pin g ord er was not exp li ci tl y supported
by all, but because these two perspec ti ves are not inh erently co ntradictory it is possible to
co mbin e them into a hybrid mod el po rtrayed in Figure 4. This hybrid mode l supports th e
maj orit y of th e participants' exp li cit perspecti ves, and beca use of th e evidence di sc ussed
above, it ca n reasonabl y be co nclud ed th at the differences between preda tory lendin g and
ab usive lending arc slight.

Abu sive Lendin g = Predatory Lending

Figure 2. Littl e or nodi fference between abusive and predatory lendin g.

Al l Lend ing

Figure 3. The overlapping order of lending.
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All Le ndi ng

Figure 4. Hybrid model of abusive and predatory lending.

Fmu!lulel/l Lending

Fraud is essentiall y any ill ega l acti vit y in th e mort gage lendin g mark et. Th e most
eo mm on exa mp les of fraud th at were shared by the part ici pants included a fai lu re to
deliver all the req uired disc losu re document at clos ing, and the fa lsifi cati on of disclosure
documents. Fraud is not limited to illegal activi ty th at harms the borrower. One
participant who deals regul arl y with fraud explai ned that fraud can ori gi nate for the sole
pur·pose of defra uding th e lender. For example, if a borrower knowi ngly posed as an
int erested customer and helped a brok er to defraud a lender, both th e borrower and th e
brok er wo ul d be members of a consp iracy. The ex pert on fra ud went on to ex pl ai n,
however, that brokers are capab le of defrauding th e lend er without disc losin g to th e
borrower thier role in the co nspi racy:
If you app roached a member of a vu lnerable class, or si ngle mother, and sa id ,
'·J' m goi ng to give yo u $500 go ahead and sign these forllls. " That person,
because they may not understand the lega l requirements or what th ey are
commi1ti ng or doing, could also be a vict im .

43

Therefore there are cases of fraud in which both the borrower and th e lend er are
si mu ltaneous ly ham1ed. The key is th at borrowers are abused direct ly and indi rectly
th rough ill ega l ac ti vity, as th e fraud ex pert conclu ded:
Was th e wo man ab used?. . I think she was a victim to mortgage ab use. I think
th ere were guys th at kn ew eno ugh abo ut th e busi ness, to where th ey kn ew how to
formu late a loan package and submit it to an underwriter, and get it approved and
too k advantage of someone who was a victi m and yet they were a party to the
fraud beca use th ey went along with it.

Fmudulenl Versus Abusive and Preda!OI)' Lending

To reit erate, the main difference between predatory and abusive lending is the act
of preyi ng on or targeting a victim , and th e main difference between predato ry and
fraudul ent lendin g is the crossing of lega l boundari es. An indu stry represent ati ve stated,
"Fra ud ca n be both abusive and predatory," o r ill ega l ac ts can be and often a re targeted
and harm fu l. Acco rdin g to the comparati ve ev id ence ment ioned, anoth er element can be
added to the fig ure depicting the relati onships of tenn s in Figu re 5. While certainl y not
precise in proportions, the idea illu strated in thi s fi gure is that accordin g to our
participants, the terms ab usive lending, predatory lendin g, and fraud (aga inst th e
bo rrower) arc very sim ilar, and often used interchangeabl y.
Figure 5 bears remarkab le simil ariti es to Figure I that was deri ved from the
lit erature. In fact, the onl y differences are th at (a) th e literature does not mak e a
conceptual compariso n of abu sive and predatory lending; and (b) parti cipa nts did not
make an ex plicit separati on of prim e and subprime lend ing.
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All Lend ing

Figure 5. Relationship of fraudul ent lending to oth er types of lending.

As introd uced in chap ter two of th is resea rch, the majo rity of preda tory mo rt gage
lending occ urs in th e subprim e market though th ere are also occas ional in stances in th e
prim e mark et. Mo rtgage fraud also occ urs in bot h markets though th e majo rity of fraud
that harms borrowers occurs in the subprime mark et. These ideas were also support ed by
the participants. Unlike the lit eratu re however, parti ci pant s also defined abus ive lending
as inclu sive of all predatory lending. Figure 6 combines the ideas found in the lit erature
and th e interviews.

Th e Ter111 "Predmor)l Lendiug"
Whi le the majori ty of the 12 parti cipant s agreed wi th nature of th e relat ionships of
term s dep icted in figu re six, there were a few dissent ing opi nions. Even though man y
participants used the term s more or less int erch angeably, some did not ex plicitl y see them
as the ame. Fo r example, referrin g to abusive and predatory lendin g, one lender sai d, " I
wo uld say th ey arc two different factors. "
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Subprim e
Ma rk et

Prim e
Market

Figure 6. Re lationships of mark et clement s based on participants and the lit erature.

Though these few dissenting op ini ons may seem to in va lidate the acc uracy of
Figure 6, further evidence supports the idea that Figure 6 is in fact co rrect, and that
di sc repancies actually originate through th e mi sunderstanding oftem1s. For exa mpl e,
one parti cipant who is in vol ved in regulati on. ex plained that the term predato ry lendin g in
parti cular, can ha ve widely varying meanin gs from one person to th e nex t, and is heav il y
innucnccd by one ' s background . In ot her words, it is lik ely that lack of parti cipant
un animit y in th e findings depicted in Figure 6 stem fro m inco mpl ete or biased
info rm atio n rather than true di sc repa ncy. Thi s was further validat ed by interchan gea bl e
nature o f the terms as used by th e parti ci pant s.
'·Predatory lending" is a catchy term , and this perhaps is the reason for its
continu ed usage, but it has ev id entl y taken o n a wider meaning than was originally
int end ed. Wh en speak ing of predatory lending, th e majority of parti cipa nts ne ith er
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confined themselves to acts of predat ion, nor did they necessaril y portray le nd ers as the
perpetra tors. They did not confi ne themse lves to description s of unethi cal acts; they also
described ill ega l or fraudul ent acti viti es as bein g predatory. ln oth er words, th e term
predat ory lendin g se rves as more of a catch-a ll for all types of unfair, home- based
lendin g practi ces rather than as a narTO\\ ly defin ed term . On the inad equ acy of the term
preda tory lendin g one branch man ager vent ed:
I don't li ke the term predatory lending. There's something about that term th at
rea ll y bothers me as a lender. But I don't know a better term for it. And th at's
the term everybod y is usi ng, but it's such a broad paintbrush that I wish someone
would come up with a bcucr de finiti on for it, and figure that out.
In sho rt , the term predatory lendin g has no in herent meaning in and o f it se lf, but
rath er different meanings are ascribed dependin g on who is using the term . Wh en
lend ers, borrowers, consum er advocates, leg islators, reporters, and resea rch ers usc the
term predatory lending it is very lik ely that th ey are all referTing to a sli ghtl y different
concept. Acco rding to participants, achievi ng co mm on understandin g is more important
th an trying to seu le an impossible argument of seman ti cs. Therefore, regard less of what
spec ifi c term was used it became apparent that the majority of the parti ci pant s' com ment s
were simpl y re ferri ng to unfair practi ces in the mortgage lendin g mark et, and were not
limit ed to predatory ac ts, ill egal act s, unethi ca l ac ts, or those spec ifi ca ll y in vo lvin g a
lender, but was rath er al l in clusive as depi cted in fi gure seven.
Because of the inclusive na ture of unfair lending, a definiti on comb ines the
elements fro m the previousl y establi shed definitions of predatory and abusive lending.
Therefore, unfair mor1gage lending practi ces arc defin ed as on e or more of the follo wing
cond iti ons: (a) a transacti on wi thout a liduciary dut y or havi ng the bo rrower's bes t
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Subprim e
Market
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Fig11re 7. Unfai r lendin g.

interest in mind, (b) a transacti on the borrower does not compl etely understand for any
reason including age, language barrier or lack of financial savvy, (c) a transacti on that has
no beneficial use or results in harm to th e borrower, (d) a loan that de li vers the lender
excessive profits, and (e) a loan that the borrower does not have the abi lity to repa y.
As further evidence wil l suggest, thi s defi niti on is more detailed and
enco mpass in g than the defi niti on given in the 2000 HUD/Treasury report (seep. 4), and
for purpo ses of co nceptu al understanding, th is de(ini ti on provid es a mu ch more use ful
starting point, specificall y for Utah (U.S. Departm ent of Housing, 2000). Yet, aga in thi s
definition is not intrinsically useful for constructing remedi es to the probl em because of
vague genera li zations and th e lack of measurability. Though discouraging these
shortcomings are not surprising given that previous studies have encountered similar
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prob lems (Specia l Comm ittee on Aging, 2004; Stei n, 200 I; U.S. Department of Housing,
2000). With each fw1her study on the topic it has become apparent that measurable
definition of predatory mort gage lending is unattainab le. In anticipation th is lack of
measurabil ity, objec tives two through six we re also inc lu ded in th is stud y so th at spec ific
detail s and measurability might be achi eved thro ugh thi s st ud y. Th e remaining sec tion s of
thi s chapter consist of additional co mment s mad e by the 12 mortgage lendin g experts and
arc intended to supplem ent this newl y formed definition by offering a more specific,
applicable, and measurable understanding of unfair lend ing practices in Uta h.

Research Objective Two: The Magnitude of Unfair Lendi ng

So urces named spec ifi c pl aces in Utah th at had ex peri enced un fa ir lending
practices inc ludi ng St. George, the west side of Sa lt Lake Vall ey, West Va ll ey City,
Ogden , and Sandy. One person also implicated the entire Wasatch Front as more or less
a hotbed or unfair lending ac ti1 ity.
One neutral participant and one industry advocate ex plained that th ey felt the
problem was minimal, whil e another industry advocate felt that it was more of a
moderate prob lem. Yet , th e majorit y of th e parti cipants of th is st udy ex plai ned th at unfa ir
lendin g was a large and inc reas in g prob lem by relati ng quotes simi lar to th ese made by
two consu mer advocates, " It is signifi cant , pmbably makes up 5-10% of th e new loan
originatio ns," and," . .. it's just a huge problem."
Many of the partici pan ts cons idered foreclosure, bankruptcy and default rates as
additional indicators of unfair lending practices. A family finance ex pert ex pl ained thi s
\iew:
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If you look at Utah ' s default rates, bankruptcy rates, I wo uld say it 's pretty high
because they all correlate. All of it plays in ... the bankruptcies, the defaults, all
of that ti e into it all together.

Research Objective Three: Vic tim Charac teri stics

Most oft en the term victim is synon ymous with th e term borrower. As di sc ussed
in th e first section of thi s chapter, thi s is not always the case because th ere are instances
in whi ch a perso n or entity other th an the borrower becomes a vict im, or in wh ich the
borrower who was originally a co-conspirator later becomes a seco ndary victim.
Descript ions of the characteristics o f all three types of victims were shared by th e
offi cials.

Th e Co-conspimtor
One partic ipant who dea ls ex tensive ly wi th cases of mortgage fraud exp lain ed
that bo rrowers often act as co-conspirators in attempts to defraud a lender. The coconspi rator is often a single minority female with good credit who has a trusting
relati onship with the dishonest broker. This ex pert explai ned that even the borrower,
though a pa rt y to the fraud , often becomes a seco nda ry victi m:
The area where I see it, primari ly mort gage brok ers, that have enough know ledge
of certain loan products, and they have a certai n knowl edge of th e way th e
in dustry functions th at they know where th ere is wiggle roo m, and so th ey
cap ita li ze on it. And th ey seek out a victim who is also a party to the fraud , and
then they sort of exp loit th em ... and the person goes along with it .. . and even
though they've seen certain red nags go up, they st ill keep goi ng for the bait , and
then aft er th e dea ls closed and the house of card s falls on them, then they know
they' ve been had.
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Thu s th e borrower is so metimes taken advant age of in cases o f fraud and , and in
ot her cases is a full accompli ce. The d istincti on depend s on how much the borrower
knows. and can sometim es be diffi cult to determin e.

N 011 - h OJ T OIVe r s

Cases of fraud usuall y target, as th e primary victim, the sources of fund s such as a
lend er, the seco nd ary market, or in vestors in genera l. A parti cipant wi th over 40 yea rs o f
experience in the homebuying market ex pl ain ed:
In Uta h, what we are talking about is that the victim is usuall y the lend er; some
rogue professional in a mortgage bro ker compan y has staged innatcd pri ces and
go t a loan .... More in vesti gation s center around the lend er, the bank, the
whol esaler. They are th e on es who a re duped. Th ey are th e ones who think th ey
are holding an 80% loan but in realit y it 's a 140% loan.
Th is expert expla in ed that ultimately those who in vest in mutual fund s and oth er
compani es that hold the values of those mortgages through the secondary mark et suffer
becau se o r unfair and fraudul ent loans:
The other victim is gray haired peopl e like me who 's 401(k) re li ed on a money
mark et manager managin g my 40 I (k). He's very good at crunchin g yie ld rates of
return but he think s the apprai er, th e mortgage broker, th e real estate agent , he
think s th e system alread y did the ri sk anal ys is for him , but th ey didn ' t. He was
foo led. The system brok e down .
Th is leads to a lower rat e of return th an investors should ri ghtfull y receiv e. On
the surface th is may appear to be onl y a min or probl em, though for individuals who use
th ese investm ent vehi cles for retirement sav ings the di sparity could ultimately result in
the loss of hundreds of thousands o f do ll ars o f retirement incom e.
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Though the losses to the industry and to investors caused by unfair lending can be
substantial on th e who le, th ey rare ly have th e same devastati ng impacts th at arc often
in curred by indi vi dual borTowers. Borrowers are not as dive rsifi ed as in ves tors usuall y
arc, and th ey cannot pass on the costs to custom ers as the industry can. A borrower ca n
suffer life altering losses due to unfair lending, and this is why th ey rece ive so much
attenti on. There are cer1ain characteristi cs that seem to make a borrower more vuln erabl e
to un fa ir lending practices. The characteri sti cs of borrowers as described by the officials
can be characteri zed as (a) th eir perso nal attributes, (b) their emoti ona l state, (c) th eir
finan cial characteristics, and (d) their general ab ilit y to understand home loa n
tran sactio ns.
Personal allributes. Victim s are li kely to either be very yo un g, or ve ry old , and

of minorit y statu s acco rding to parti cipant s. On e homebu ying co unse lor described
severa l ex peri ences of working wi th very yo un g couples who sometimes we re not yet
eve n married but were tryin g to arrange financin g for a home. Old er ad ults seem to be a
mo re popular target, espec ially for refin ancin g or equity based loans du e to built up
equ ity th at has been acc umul ated over a lifetim e. Older adults are sometimes
increasingly vulnerabl e due to loss of form er capaciti es, as seen in an exa mpl e shared by
a neutral pa rticipant:
But th ey can also be peo ple who once were very sharp but they are eld erl y and
they have slowed down ... that happens to someone who was an attorn ey or a
CE O of a compan y, that th ey've been retired for 20 or 30 years and they are a
littl e slow, yet they are too proud or too embarrassed when they even think that its
go in g so uth to say anything until it s too late.
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Minority group members also tend to be victimi zed disproportionately, though
most intcrvie" ees ci ted language barriers as the rea l cause of vulnerabilit y. The language
barri er can prevent a minorit y indi vidu al fro m doing adequate shopping, and may lead to
agree ment s with the first perso n th ey fee l th ey can trust, whether of not th eir rates are
competiti ve. Man y tim es thi s leads to in stances of len din g canniba lism, whi ch in vo lves a
lender or brok er of th e same ethni c backgrou nd tak ing advan tage of minority borrowers
beca use of assumed tru st and lack of op ti ons.
Though minoriti es may have a somewhat legitimate reason for not pursuing ot her
borrowing options, they are not the onl y ones who fai l to shop and price co mpare before
ent erin g a loan . Vict im s arc sometim es thought to be somewhat irresponsibl e when it
comes to protect ing themselves, parti cularl y by not taking th e initiative to shop arou nd
fo r good deal s. Sti ll , others attrib ute thi s failure to shop aro und not to a lack of
rcspon ibili ty, but rath er to an overl y trusting attitude. Officials indicat ed th at Utah
bo rro\\ ers are overl y trusting espec iall y when it comes to mortgage lending beca use as a
homcb uying counse lor expl ained, ·· Peopl e put a lot of tru st into those professionals."
Several participants ex plained th at th ere are so man y di verse characteristi cs that
could make someone more susceptibl e to unfa ir loa ns that it is perfectl y reaso nabl e to
ass um e that anyo ne coul d pot entia ll y be a victim. One neutral parti cipant summari zed by
saying, " Minorit y groups, seni ors, low- income, and actuall y, it can be anybod y."
Em01ional characlerislics of borrowers. Emotional characteristi cs also pl ay a key

role in borrower vulnerabi lity. Pee lings of desperation are common emoti ons and can
stem from excess ive debt. Mortgage debt s are perhaps the most pressing; mi ss ing onl y
one or two payments ca n send the borrower into a pani c to avoid forec losure, which ca n
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lead to ac ts o f desperati on. Borrowers in these precarious situations arc apt to be more
recepti ve to loan soli citati ons, as one lender ex plain ed:
You get a little bit desperate and for instance ... I'm down maybe two mort gage
payments, and th e mort gage co mpan y keeps ca ll ing me and th ey' re sending me
th ese letters and tellin g me I' m going to get foreclosed on, and then all of th e
sudden I get a ca ll from a telcmark ctcr or fro m a mortgage brok er who says,
" Hey. we can take care of yo ur probl ems," and then emo ti onall y, I think J' mm ore
willi ng to take ca re of the imm edi ate problems, and not thin k of the long- term
consequences that thi s hi gh interest rate loa n is going to ha ve on me .
Additionall y, peer press ure seems to pl ay a large rol e in borrowers overstepping
thei r bounds. Thi s may not even be ex pli ci t pressu re to keep up with fri end s but may
start as a su bconscious thought when th ey see thei r fri end s enterin g homes, and they
reali ze th at th e same opportunit y may be availabl e to them, as ex pl ain ed by a housing
counse lor:
Th eir fri end s are getting hom es. Th ey heard somebody got into the down
payment program , and they cam e, and th ey weren't even thinking about bu yin g a
home until they hea rd th eir friends had one, and th eir friend s say, " Hey, go ahead
and get one too."

Th e need for instant credit or for instant gratifi cation was al so o ffered as an
emotional stimulant. A finan cial co unselor related an in stance in whi ch a cli ent had just
co me out o f bankruptcy, and in spite o f her destroyed credit she immediat ely entered the
homcbu yin g mark et. Th e edu cat or ex pl ain ed that thi s clien t was not deterred at all by
hi gh int eres t rates, sh e ju st wa nted a house imm ediately, in spite of an y long-term
co nsequences . Even the initial con sequences were quite severe as she entered I 00%
fi nancing, th e first 80% at doubl e th e prim e rate and th e last 20% at quadrup le th e prim e
rate. It is littl e wond er thi s cli ent was previous ly in vo lved in bankruptcy; she seemed
addicted to the emotional joys of instant credi t.
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Financial clwraCleristics of harrowers. Financial characteristics of borrowers

also play a rol e in a borrower's susceptibilit y to unfair lendin g practices. A financial
ed uca tor ex plain ed that in additi on to the instant credit mentality described above, people
seem to lac k th e financial skill s eve n to manage cred it or to rehabilitate damaged credit.
Ot her financial characteri st ics th at co ntribut e to vulnerability include a lack of sav ings,
low- or moderate-income statu s, and , of co urse, those wi th large amounts of eq uity in
their homes such as eld erly ad ults di sc us ed previously. But as an educati on coo rdin ator
exp lained, ··[What is important is] not just (bei ng] educated as far as everyday literacy,
but finan cial education." Even very bri ght and we ll ed ucated peopl e have becom e
victim s simpl y because th eir finan cial skill s are inadequate.
Genera/understanding of tile 1110rtgage 111arket. Overa ll, Uta hn s lack fin ancial

lit eracy. and even a general understandin g of th e mort gage market. Many, espec ially
first-tim e home bu yers, ent er the mortgage market opti mi stica ll y but lack the ex peri ence
and education to undertake the compl ex iti es involved in a home loan transac ti on. On e
participa nt involved in regul ation illustrated :
The peopl e who [arc ex ploi ted arc] ... the un sophi sti cated co nsum ers who
orh erwise are nor in a position to protect th emse lves, either beca use th ey arc
un sophisticated or not kno wledgeabl e about how the mark et wo rk s, or what th ey
may be getting them se lves into. And thai may be because of ... the leve l of
ed ucation or experience that person has.
Even those who feel they are ready to und er1ake a home loan transaction can find
them se lves lost in inches of paper wo rk , much of it co mprised of lega l di sc losures that
are designed to protect the consumer. The more paperwork there is, the less lik ely it is to
be read, ex plained a regional lending manager who went on to say, .. 1 wo uld dare say a
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\Cry \'Cry small percentage of the population understand what they arc signin g. and
understand the terms of their Joan."

Research Objective Fo ur: Facto rs th at Foster Unfair Lendin g

Participants desc ribed that the litctors and co nditions th at have led to the ex istence
of unfair lending practi ces stem from three basic areas: industry co nditi ons, pub li c
f>lc tors, and legal structure. Each of these facto rs is exam ined individually, and then
overlapping factors are discussed.

lndusll:r Facrors
Market co111plexirJ·

Mark et co mpl ex it y was one of the most cit ed factors for

th e ex istence of unfair lending. Th e mortgage lendin g market is very co mpl ex and as a
co nseq uence borrowers sometim es have a tough tim e di scerning the terms of their loa ns.
One consumer advocate described that mort gages and real estate transactions virtua ll y
have their own languages, meaning that discussing mortgages and real estate ca n invol ve
technical and ind ustry spec ifi c terms th at borrowe rs may fail to grasp. Espec iall y when
reading th e req uired di sc losures, borrowers have sometim es been known to read throu gh
entire disc los ures and still enter into unfair loa ns beca use th ey simpl y do not understand
them. Co mpl ex it y of di sc losures is great ly co mpound ed by th e quantity of di sc losu res
that are assoc iated wi th a single loan. In terestingly, the following co mm ent came from
one of the part icipants who is also an attorney:
There are so man y of them that di sc losu res are becoming meani ngless. I heard
somebody say, and I don ' t know this as a fac t, but when you close on a mor1gage,
if yo u act uall y read every document th at is prepared in con necti on with that
mortgage, it would take somethin g lik e I 0 hours. And th e las t tim e I got a home
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mon !Sage Joan we were in the clo ing fo r about45 minutes. So it was j ust one
doc ument aft er another bei ng laid in front of me and signin g it, and I alm ost got
writers cramp . And th ose doc um ems were full of di sc losures and I paid no
all ellli on to th em at all.
/JoouJing housing n1arke1. Additi onal factors con tributing to th e ex istence of

unfair lendin g inc lude the fai rl y recen t market booms, and th e swellin g numbers of
lend ers tryin g to mak e their way in th e market. So me of these lenders ha ve become bad
ac tors5 who s impl y use the mor1gage lendin g market as a tool for exercising th eir
craft iness and greed, ex plained one regul ator who shared, " It 's just the dri ve for th e
alm ight y do llar. It's see ing an opponuni ty to make so me money, and they arc willin g to
bend th e law as th ey see it , break the law, forfeit their ethi cs, in ord er to make money."
The 11Wrke1 system. St ill oth ers do not blame the lend ers as much as th ey do th e

structure of the mortgage lending sys tem. They exp lain that it operates incorrectly, or
that lenders and other actors have mi spl aced in centi ves and are more or less forced to be
un fa ir in ord er to stay in busin ess. An allorn cy ex plain ed, ""The system is set up to
incenti vise peopl e to do th e most loans th ey can do . The whol e system is setup on
vo lum e and I think th at maybe pu shes peopl e to, in one way or another, be more greedy."
Parti c ipants al so ex pl ain ed that th e system naws origi nate with in vestors, also
known as th e secondary mark et, through whi ch actors are often reward ed finan ciall y for
arrangin g very ri sky loan s, even when those loans have no logica l benefit to th e
bo rrower.

\ The tt'rm "bad actor .. ,,·as used by the U.S. Departmem of Treasury (2000) and o ther literature, as well as

by participants in this study to desc ri be all

p~.:qJe t rators

in unfa ir loans, not just lenders. This could include

nppra iscrs. brokers, loan officers, rea l es tate agen ts. and any other party that ac ts as a pe rpe trator of unffl ir
lending actio ns.
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Factors Related to the General Public
The ex perts di sc ussed many factors re lat ed to the nature of the public, or
borrowers collect ive ly, that fo ste r the ex istence o f unfair loans. A large in nux of
minoriti es wi th a lang ua ge barri er, increasing popularity of instant c redit, a lack of
com munity reso urces for bo rro we rs, a huge push for hom eow nership for all, and th e
tru st ing nature of Utah borrowers, were all reasons c ited w hy the publi c is so vuln erable
to un fa ir lending practices. Th e c lea r majority of com ments concerning publi c
vuln erabilit y ac tuall y concerned th e gene ral leve l of awareness. W hen asked about
ed ucat ional opport uniti es for pote ntial borrowers one financ e ed ucator co nveyed, " The
education is the re . . . I think it 's ava ilabl e, it 's just peopl e knowing. Knowing, not just
that it's th ere, but also knowing the va lu e of it is huge."
Additiona l public factors that the participants we re concerned w ith were th e hi gh
rates of fo reclos ure and default , w hi ch not on ly lead to a press in g need to re finan ce, but
also lead to ta rni shed credit hi stori es, leav in g fewe r option s and high er rates for these
homeowners w hen it co mes tim e to refinance .

Legal Factors
For the most part , participants also agreed that th e legal system was at least
parti a ll y to blam e for condit ions that allowed unfair lendi ng practices to occur. Yet there
was littl e ag reement on what exactl y was wro ng with th e system. Approx imately half of
the parti c ipants c laim ed that the lega l system was too re lax ed, espec ia ll y w ith usury rates
and caps. Th e other half, ho wever, felt differe ntl y, that there were too many laws, or that
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laws were too compl ex to be useful, such as the case wi th the nu mbers of disc losures
described above.
Accoulllabilily. With current laws it is oft en Li mes diffi cult to ho ld market

ac tors acco untabl e for th eir actions, wh eth er good, or bad. Th e majo rit y of th e
part icipants fe lt that licensing of ma rket acto rs was a beller approach for increasin g
accoun tabi lit y than Jaws th at spec ifi ca ll y rest ric t practi ces or behaviors. In additi on to
licensi ng, participants beli eved that th e probl em is not that current legis lat io n is
inadeq uate, but rat her, th at the currcnL Jaws a re not adequately enforced. The form er
owner of a lendi ng fi rm ex pl ain ed, ·'U tah is a state that just doesn' t seem to have, we ll we
have laws. and they are already on th e books, th ey just don ' t seem to have any real teeth
in th e Jaws. "
This lender continu ed, " I thin k that the Di vision of Real Esta te docs a good job
wi th th e few reso urces th at arc avai lable 10 them." Additi onal comm ent s support ed thi s
idea th at the state's regul atory agencies do as much as poss ibl e but si mply Jack suffi cient
resources to effec ti vely mon ito r lending act ivit y in th e state. Also vo iced by parti ci pants
is the idea that the current Jaws may be adequ ate, but th e penalti es fo r violations of these
laws arc not. On pena lti es th at are currentl y on the books, a lender desc ribed:
The onl y thin g yo u co uld do is spank the realtor on the hand , and slap him with a
$5 00 fi ne, whi ch I believe is the max imum , or at least it was when I wo rked there.
And [fo r] the appraiser [it] wo uld be $ 1000 and th e max imum yo u co uld gel out
of a lender woul d be $2500.
Borrowers can lose lens or even hundreds of thousands of doll ars, and even th eir
homes, as a result of bad loans. Simi larly, market ac tors are sometim es abl e to fin agle
tens or hu ndreds of thousa nds of dollars from a sing le bo rrower. Th e current penalti es as
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desc ri bed by this len der hard ly seem suffi cient to deter un ethi cal mark et acti vit y among
ac tors who simp ly see th ese fees as a cost of do ing bu siness.
Jurisdicriona l houndaries. Penalties do not serve as much o f a deterrent to

wo uld -be perpet rat ors o f un fa ir lendin g, bu t in additi on, the chances of ever being ca ught
in the first pl ace are in reality, quite slim . Thi s is partl y du e to th e stru cture of th e legal
sys tem, or rath er th e structure o f jurisdi cti onal boundari es of the regul atory bodi es
invo lved in home-based lendi ng. Juri sd icti onal bound ari es are perce ived as very
co nfus ing and uno rga ni zed, and have been blamed for ca usin g man y in stances of unfai r
lendin g to "s lip thro ugh th e cracks." When asked whi ch regul atory body was in charge of
regu lating seco nd mortgages one neutral parti cipant repli ed:
It may not Ca ll und er anybody's. Th e Di vision o f Real Estate regul ates first
res id ent ia l mort gages by nond epos itori es. If th ey do comm ercial loans [th e
Division] doesn' t regul ate it, if' th ey do seco nd mortgages [th e Di vision] does n' t
regulate it. Yo u get so met hing like th e loan fraud that we saw a few years ago
with Fairbanks Capital, [th e Di vision] didn 't regul ate that becau se they don ' t
regul ate se rvicers. That co mes und er th e Department of Fin ancial In stituti ons.
When I say th ey don ' t regul ate it , I don ' t want yo u to get th e impress ion that
th at's so methin g that they choose, but th at by statute, it 's not given to th em to
regulate.
One part ic ipant desc ribed in stances in whi ch several indu stry actors were not even aware
of which governin g body regul ated their parti cul ar areas of busi ness. Tabl e 4 was
deve loped by one of th e parti cipants during an int erview to describe th e eli vision o f
regulati on and the types o f lend ers and th e impacts of thi s structure o f orga ni zation.
Though thi s tabl e exp lain s th e di vision of juri sdi ction a bit more clearl y, it does
not adequately descri be who regu lates second -mo rtgage lend ers, hom e remodelin g
fi nance rs, home eq uity lenders or oth ers who do not fa ll directl y into the ca tegori es o f
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Table 4
Division of Regu!arion and !he Types of Lenders
Regulated by:

Department of Financial
lnsti tutions

Division of Real Estate

Cla ssi !ications ·

Depo sitori es
(Banks. Cred it Unions or
affiliate)

Nondepositories

La rger banks such as We ll s
Fargo and Zions.
Most regulat ed group.
(Least amount of predatory
loans)

Closes loans in th eir own name and
then se ll s them off to the seco ndary
mark et.

May be a sma ll comm unity
bank that does not hold
loans in the ir own
portfolio.

Never owns the paper and doesn't
have deposits.
Least regu lated group of all.
(Most predatory loans)

Mortgage Banker
(Owns the
mortgage note)

Has regu lar audits.

Mortgage Broker
(Never owns the
mortgage not e)

Does not have regular
audits.

depository and non depository. Several parti cipants emphasi zed that th e issue was not a
de fi ciency in the abilities of the state's cu rrent regulatory bodies, but rather a lack of
adequately defined areas of regulation. Th e ex perts exp lained that in jurisdictiona l issues
th e state has little control because the divisions of authority are often passed down from
th e federal leve l. This concept was ex plained by a participant with over 20 years
ex perience in the mark et:
They actuall y attempted to do uni versa l li cens ing in Utah. The federal ly
cha rtered depository institutions said, "Hey, do what yo u want License away! We
are a federa ll y chartered bank, we're subj ect to federal laws , and so i fyou pass all
this licensi ng stuff' we're go in g to claim federa l preemption. So put al l the
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restrictions that yo u want on yourse lves, we're going to be exempt because we're
federa ll y chartered." Thi s is one of the reasons for th e division of regulation of
mort gage lenders in this state betwee n the Division of Real Estate for
nondeposi tori es and the Department of Financial Institutions for depositories.

01•er/apping Factors

So me of th e factors discu ssed by the part icip ants seemed to have an overl apping
nature, or had an inOuence over more than one of the prev iously desc ri bed areas. Fo r
exampl e, according to several participan ts, the lack of accountability in both the industry
and th e pub li c have led to condit ions that foster greater unfair lend ing acti vity. ··There is
responsib ilit y on both si des," one ed uca tor adm itted. Ignorance on the part of con um crs
and greed on the part of th e lend ers too o ft en goes unchecked, and th at co mbinati on of
co nd iti ons ha s led to most occurrences of unfair lend ing, acco rding to on e lend er.
Ohstacles to victim redress. Parti cipant s also felt that there were man y obstac les

that preven ted consumers li·om rece ivin g adequa te redress once they had been victimi zed.
This can be seen as a lega l problem or a cons umer awareness prob lem depending on the
si tuation. Accord ing to a regul ator awareness of avenues for redress is an issue, "They
may not know th at th ey can or where to go." Thi s certainl y mak es sense co nsid ering th e
ju ri sdi cti ona l iss ues di scussed prev iously. If so me indu stry actors are not even awa re of
what regulatory body has juri sdi ct ion over th em, it stand s to reason that a borrower
wou ld lind it difficult , if not imposs ibl e, to lodge an official comp laint aga inst such a
compan y.
Even those who do manage to lod ge co mplaints rarely see effect ive results
according to a consumer advocate who said,·' o everyone asks me, ·Well why bother
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go ing through all thi s'l Why give you all my information and talk to yo u when yo u can't
fi x it?' And you can't, you can' t fi x it. Very rarely. And that 's been my ex peri ence."
La ck of resources for prevention and repamtion. The lack of resources can be
viewed as a lega l or a consumer issue. Lack of reso urces is indeed an obstacle for
regulatory bodies as discussed prev iousl y. Beyond legal resources, educators and
co nsum er advocates also lack reso urces spec ificall y for prevention of, and reparations
from unfair lending. On preventative measures one educator ex plain ed, ''The probl em is
fu nding. If we had enough fund ing we co uld offer these c lasses for free and attrac t a lot
more peo pl e to come." As far as recove1·i ng losses from in stances of unfa ir lendin g,
parti cipants ex pl ai ned that it usuall y req uires th e services of an atto rney, but th e costs of
th ese services ca n eas ily ou tweigh th e potential be nefi ts, as one atto rn ey ex plained," ... is
it wo rth go in g after them'l . . An attomey who has to ea rn a fee off of[ the case] is not
lik e ly to s ue them." But it is clear that wheth er it be for consumer education or for
trackin g clown and prosec utin g bad actors, th ere are just not enough reso urces availabl e
for prevention of and reparations from cases of unfair lendin g.
Pressure to arrange bad loans. La rge amounts of press ure and emotion on both
sid es leads industry actors and cons um ers to a1-range loan s that are not eco nomi ca ll y
logica l. An ow ner of a lendi ng finn exp lained that lend ers fac e press ure from all
cl i ffcren t areas :

Someti mes I think pressure is self-imposed by a loan offic er that' s makin g a loan.
Perh aps they've told peo pl e all along, " Hey, th is loan looks good , no prob lem''
And so me kind or a probl em co mes up toward th e tim e a closin g is app roac hing
an d people have literal ly boxed up their house, and have mo ving vans go in g and
all of the sudden there's a probl em.
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Lenders can face self imposed pressure, to earn profits or simp ly to sati sfy the
borrower. Borrowers ca n also be very emotionally charged for many reasons, but often a
primary reason is sim pl y th e magn itude of the financ ial transaction . The lender ex plains:
For most peopl e it' s th e largest financia l tran sacti on th ey've eve r made, so there
ca n be a lot of emoti ons that co me into play. And peo pl e sometim es act in ways
th ey wo uldn'tnormall y act because of the pressures in vo lved with dead li nes,
money involved , and all those kinds of" things.
Lock of measurement standards. Pressure and emotion on both sides of the

transaction can create prime conditions for the arrangement of"'economically illogical
loans." a neutral participant observed. The lack of a consistent and accurate
measurement sta ndard ha s made it imposs ible to identify what consti tutes an
eco nomi ca ll y ill ogica l loan. Thi s is yet anoth er factor th at has all owed unfair lending to
persist, beca use occ urrences can and often do remain undetected by all parti es in cluding
borrowers. lenders and even lega l enforcers until it is too late. Due to thi s lack of
standard meas urement , unfair lending is currently treated on a "case-by-case basis,"
described a directing member of a national lend ing finn.

Summar)" ofOhjective Four

There were four genera l catego ri es fo r the facto rs and conditi ons that fos tered th e
ex istence ofu nl"a ir lend ing in Uta h: indu stry, public, lega l, and overl app in g fac tors.
Participants in dicated that iJTesponsibilit y and lack of accountability pers ists on bot h
sid es of transactions. Panicipants also ex pl ained that th e mortgage lendi ng market is
comp lex and vast, and lenders and borrowers alike often face connicting incenti ves, due
to curren t market structure. Additionally there are serious jurisdictional issues and
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ce rtain types of lending occur without any go' ernm ent regul atio n, leadi ng to ma ny
eli ffi culties includi ng lack of adeq uate victim redress.

Resea rch Object ive Five: Practices

In the fo ll ow in g story related by a lending co unse lor, there are ro ughl y seven
pract ices menti oned that have been de fi ned by one or more in terview parti cipant s as
unfair lending prac ti ces:
l' llt ell yo u a story. In rura l Utah there was a fam ily that was q ua lifi ed fo r a loa n
that was way more than they cou ld afford, and ... just pushing those ratios to th e
max .... It was a ba ll oo n payment. Knowi ng that it co uld not succeed, th e lender
put the m in it anyway .... It was adj ustabl e rate which is fin e under cert ain
circum stances, but with a lend er who knows that they've alread y stretched th e
rati os as far as they can . .. And th en, the seco nd that rat e goes up , th ey are just
go in g to bt-cak the famil y. And th en puttin g that prepayment pena lty so th ere's no
way th ey can get out. You al so sec that realtor-lend er group .. .. that th ey put
yo u in hopin g that it will fitil so th at they ca n bu y the house and rese ll it to
so mebody else who ca n fitil , and make tons o f money on both end s o f it.
In general. unfa ir mortgage lending practices th at res ult in a negat ive effect on a
bo rrower ca n be divided into t\\ o di stin ct ca tegories : un fair actions on the pa rt o f bad
ac tors, an d un fa ir loan fea tu res. Before

introdu~i n g

th e rest of thi s secti on a point th at

can not be overemph as ized, and with whi ch most parti cipant s agreed, is that many of
th ese acti ons or features do not, by th emse lves, necessaril y mak e a loan predat ory,
abu sive or unfair. It is the case, however, that eac h of the practices or loan features
discussed in thi s sec ti on has at one poin t been used, and has been at least partiall y to
blame fo r an occurrence of unfair lending. Each unfa ir action and loa n fea tu re is
discu sed " ith supportin g ev idence offered bv the ex perts.
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Unjitir Actions
I 00% financing. One indu stry advocate, one consumer advocate and one neutral

part icipa nt described that I 00% financing can be a good thing, and is often directl y
support ed by governm ent sponso red or non-profit co nsum er agencies. Yet, th ey fee l th at
it is o l"tcn mi sused, espec iall y when arranged direc tl y by lenders. The first 80% is o11en
several points above the prim e rate. which isn't necessari ly harmful , but the last 20% will
oft en be financed at a 20% interest rate or even higher. Acco rd ing to these participant s,
thi s creates a harmful situ3tion "ith the borrower li ving in an unaffordabl e house with
unaflo rd ab lc payment s.
J-.l'ear C}>c/e oflooll officer employtllel/t. One pa rticipant wit h ex tensive

ex perience in th e bankin g indu stry ex plai ned what she ca ll ed, a "3-yea r cyc le." The 3yea r cyc le entai Is dea lin g with a loan officer who att empts to evade internal audi ts th at
are con duct ed regul arl y by deposito ry institutions. Thi s perso n offers hi gh priced and
abus ive loa ns. and after about 3 years th e loa ns made by th is officer wi ll start fai li ng and
goi ng into foreclosu re. By thi s time, however, the loan officer has moved to another
co mpan y and started th e process all over agai n. The new company is not aware o f th e
behav ior of th ese offi cers; in fa ct, when they hired him and talk ed to Hum an Reso urces at
his form er co mpan y, he wa s o ft en characterized as one of their top produ cers. Th is
eventuall y leaves th e borrowers and the banks" ith the bad loa ns, whil e the officer is free
to continue ea rn ing large co mmi ssions.
Bait and switch. Bait and switch practices were on ly exp li cit ly disc ussed by one

co nsu mer ed ucator, thou gh it was impli ed by many other parti cipa nts. Bait a nd sw itch
practi ces in vo lve lurin g in borrowers with promises of low rates and fees, so metimes
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eve n on wrill cn good faith estimat es, but changing all of those figures to hi gher rates at
th e tim e of clos ing. Man y bo rrowers arc o emoti onal ly in vo lved and unde r pressure at
th e tim e of clos ing that th ey wi ll sign th e doc umen ts anyway. The educator ad mill ed that
borrowers need to be more responsibl e, and not to sign und er tho se circum s tan ces, but
that man y borrowers are just not aware of the ir ri ghts in those types of situ ati ons, and arc
so metimes threatened and pressu red into sig ning.
Lending cannibalism. Lending canniba li sm captures the idea that min oriti es use

their commo naliti es such as language and cu lture to prey on borrowe rs of their own
ethni c background. Two co nsumer advoca tes and one neutral parti cipa nt ex pl ained that
thi s is a common occurre nce. Th e neutral parti c ipant ex plained:
I've seen Hi span ics takin g ad va nt age of Hi span ics. That seems to be the biggest
nati onal origin group th at's do ing th at. It will be a Hi span ic rea ltor, Hi spani c
lend er, and so metim es even the in surance co mpa ny, are all in ca hoo ts together, or
have o ne compan y th at th ey go to and they package the whol e dea l.
Criminal condllcl. Crimina l co ndu ct. ex plained an attorney, can range from

complete fra ud, to fai lure to disclose proper terms, or failu re to give a good faith
estimate. A neutral participant ex pl ained that these act ivities are ill ega l and are certainl y
unfa ir, and ha rm fu l.
Etj llit\ · hased lending. Two co nsum er advocat es and three neutral pa rti cipant s

ex plain ed th at equity based lendin g is quite co mmon. Thi s includ es qu alifying a
borrower for a loan based on eq uit y an d not inco me. Equity based lend ing can also
invo lve equity stripping through repeated refi nanci ng, and often happen s to elderly adults
because th ey usuall y have large amou nt s of equit y that has been built up over the yea rs.
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Misleading information. Two ind us try advocates, two consum er advocates, and

one neutral parti ci pant di sc ussed mi slead in g inform ation as being parti cul arly harm ful. A
neutral participant ex plain ed th at thi s is a gray area but is certainl y harm ful :
To mislead so mebody about what those terms are, wo ul d agai n, wi th th e intent to
get th em in to a loa n that if th ey rea ll y understood those tem1s, a reaso nable person
... wo ul d not enter the tra nsact ion.
Scheme to steal fro m borrowers. Two neutral part ici pants ex pl ained th at many

ti mes ac tors arc not rea ll y in bu siness to make money legiti mately but are s impl y using
lending as a means to stea l. One shared :
But th e rea l predators are the ones th at not only sel l a pack age th at is not good for
yo u, but they sell you a package and then rol l it two or th ree times to th e point
tha t the fees have been jacked so hi gh, that they intend to reall y stea l the property.
That 's a real predatory thi ng.
Mullij>le salarv qualification. On e con sum er co unselor ex plain ed that she sees

man y loa ns that were arran ged based on multipl e sa lari es, or usin g the combi ned inco me
of all resi dents in the hou seho ld . Sometim es the income of a tempora ril y residing
relati ve is inc luded. Thi s can be harmfu l as she ex plains:
But when one guy moves out , they don ' t have eno ugh money an y more, and th ere
arc j ust too man y peo pl e on the Joan, too many sa lari es being considered, whi ch is
rea lly go ing on here a lot. Every minorit y that co mes in for default co unse ling
has a [m ulti ple sa lary) Joan.
Flipping. Flipping, disc ussed by two co nsum er advocates and one neutral

parti cipant, is bas ica ll y repeated refin ancing of a hom e, often with the intent to strip
equity. The perpetrator will usuall y set the monthl y payment amo unt de liberately hi gh so
that the borrower cannot make th e payments. And when they cannot make the payments,
they wi ll refinance, and wh il e th e monthl y payment mi ght be a littl e lower, the
perpet rator wil l make large profit s from th e c los in g fees of th e origina l loa n and th e
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open ing of a new loan. The perpet rator ca n do thi s until the equit y is en tirely stripped
and the borrower cannot affo rd th e fees to refi nance, leading to forec losure.
Abusive servicing. Th e day to day responsibiliti es of collecting payments from

th e borrowers are often sold to third part y co ll ectors known as loan scrvicc rs. According
to one co nsum er advocat e and one neutral parti cipant, th ere are unfair prac ti ces occ urTing
in th e servicing market. Servieers ha ve been known to add bogu s fees, int enti onall y hold
payments to earn late fees, and to frequentl y lose payments. Acco rding to a co n um cr
advocate, servicers require co mpl aints and disputes in writing within 30 days, but do not
tell the bo rrowe rs this, often leav in g the borrower unable to address any prob lem on th eir
acco unt. Th ese unfair se rvicin g penalti es can add up , as a consumer advocat e shared, " I
ju st saw one the other day and it was $9,000 mo re add ed to their principal."
Sreering. Steering, acco rdin g to one parti cipant from each category, is leading a

customer to a hi gher cost product th an th ey wou ld rea ll y qualify for. Thi s could in vo lve
actively steerin g a customer to hi gher rates. or a subprim e lender omitting o r hiding from
a borrower with good credit that they cou ld get a better price with a prim e lend er.
Una.!Jordab/e lending. Unaffo rd ab le lendin g, accord ing to a co nsumer advocate

is," ... just pu shin g those ratios to th e max. " Th e rat ios referred to in clude debt -toin co me rati os, and loan-p ayme nt -to-in co me ratios. Mortgage lend ers often use such
ratios to determine th e cred it ri sk of indi vidual s, but ofien pu sh th e debt-load and
mon thl y pa yments as hi gh as poss ibl e. Thi s can also be facilitat ed by down paymen t
ass istance, or loans from relati ves, "And th en it just snowball s from there." Three
consum er advocates, two indu stry advocates, and all four neutral participants commented
that unaffordab le lendin g is a comm on unfair lending occurrence.

69
Prel'ing on vulnerabilities. Accordi ng to the neutral participants, two consumer

advocates, and one industry advocate, un fa ir lending in vo lves the act of preyin g on
speci fi c charac teri stics of vuln erab le bo rrowe rs in order to use one or more o f th e li sted
unfair acti ons or loan featu res to increase profit s. One neutral parti cipant ex plai ned, " It is
somebody out there who is not looking fo r a typical borrower. Th ey arc look in g for
someone who is in very ex treme circum stances, so th ey can tak e advantage of them."
!lhusive networking. Two cons um er advocates, one industry advocate, and one

neutral participant exp lain ed that ac tors will someti mes network and consistentl y
coo perate with the int ent of taki ng advan tage of a borrower. One consum er advocate
ex plain ed:
I always say th at, " like" peop le get togeth er. Often th e loan officers have " li ke"
apprai sers and rea l estate agent s and th ey will cont inue to wo rk togeth er through
th e years and through different compani es. Th ey beco me very good at wo rking as
a tea m to rip peopl e o ff.
01 ·emppraising. A key part of ab usive netwo rks is arranging overappraised

values of propert ies. This creates a real problem when borrowers attempt to refinance or
sell , and are unabl e to ac hi eve the ori ginal purchase pri ce of the propert y.

Unfair Loan Feat ures
Adjustable rate mortgages. Adju stab le rate mortgages (ARM s). lik e so many

ac ti ons and loa n features , are not inh erentl y un fai r in and of themse lves, bu t are often
mi sused acco rding to two indu stry advocate , one co nsumer advoca te, and o ne neutral
part icipant. One lend er elucidated:
Fo r example, and thi s is a personal bias, beca use you can talk to peo pl e who think
ARMs are the greatest thing since sli ced bread. But I parti cul arl y have iss ues
wi th op ti on ARM s. Those are th e loans th at yo u've hea rd abo ut on th e radio or
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seen on the billboard that advertise a 1.9% interest rate, or so methin g that is
dramatica lly lowe r than what th e market interest rate is.
Teaser r(l{e. Simi lar to ARMs, teaser rates are frowned upon by tw o lend ers in

th e stud y. On e lender ex plain ed hi s views:
A lot of times they will have a tease1· rate on the front end , and th en th ey' ll ha ve
negati ve amorti zation or they' ll have a six month introductory rate. A lborrower
who is so mew hat behind on hi s current loan] is thinkin g, ''Oh my heck, I've go t to
get th ese two payme nt s made or my house is goi ng to go," and [the borrower] is
not thinking abo ut what's goi ng to happen to [him] six month s from now. And so
th ese guys wi ll suck [hi m] into a teaser rate, and th en they' ll whack [him ] with a
hi gher rate.
Balloon pay ments. According to two consumer advocates, one neutral

part icipant, and one indu stry advocate, th e inclu sion of a balloon payment ca n be very
harmful beca use it can mak e the payment s in a loa n artifi cial ly low and prevent equit y
from acc umulating. On e attorney ex plain ed, 'The ba lloon payment is one way, when
somebody is stru ggling along makin g paymen ts, all of the sudd en you ca n lam them
wi th a ba ll oo n and that 's when yo u ca n go in and grab the house."
Credit insurance. Credi t insurance desc ribed by one neutral parti ci pant is usuall y

not beneficial to the borrower, and is so met imes hidden and fin anced wi thin the loan, and
is simpl y ano th er way to earn more profi ts from a borrower.
Fin(//tcedfees. Credit in surance is not the only charge that is finan ced into a loan;

if borrowers are unable to pay for fees up front, it is not uncommon to have th em roll ed
up in to th e loan. Thi s leads to th e long term interest charges not on ly on th e loan bu t al so
on the fees in the loan. One lender in th e study saw thi s as parti cul arly unfair.
1/itl!/en charges. Often the credit insurance and other fees are rolled int o the loan

and th e borrower is compl etely un aware of it. One neutral participant ex plain ed that thi s
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practice is unfair and abusive, "And a lot of times, they kind of hide it. You don't even
know you' re gelling it , and it rea ll y doesn't do much for you, and it can add a good
I 0,000, S 15.000, or $30,000 into yo ur loan."
lligi! fees. Two indu stry advocates and two neutral parti cipants agreed that hi gh

fees are simpl y a problem . One neutral part icipa nt ex pla ined, " If th e interest rate docsn 't
do th e person in, the fees will. It ca n add anywhere from a couple thousand to S I0,000 to
$ 15 ,000 into their loan.''
1/igi! interest rates. Hi gh interest rates can be ex tremely detrimental to a

borrower accon.ling to two neutral participants and two consumer advocates. A neutral
participant ex pl ain ed, "Again, the biggest thing is high interest rates, way above whatever
th e normal ra tes are. Lets say ours arc around fi ve or six right now, they' d be anywhe re
to 8 to 12 to 15, 16, 18 percent.''
lllferest only loans. One neutral parti ci pant ex plained that int erest o nl y loa ns are

ofte n mi sused, " Paying interest only, your payment wou ld be lower so you could pay
more for a bigger home. Peopl e get into houses that are way over their heads. I think
those should be ill ega l, but again that 's my op ini on."
Frepoyment p enalties. Two lend ers, two neutral participants and one consumer

advoca te ex pla ined that prepaym ent penalt ies arc frequently mi sused and often prevent
borrowers from being able to refinance out of the bad loan situation. When other ab uses
occ ur in a loan there may be no escape, according to one neutral participan t, '"There was a
prepayment penalty. . so there 's no way they can get out."
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Research Objecti ve Six: How to Reduce Predatory Lending

From th e prev iously shared ev idence it is abundantl y clear that unfair lending
practices are wid esp read, are perpetuated due to numerous factors , in vo lve an in estim ab le
amount of specific practices, can happen to near ly every class of person, and affec t nearly
everyo ne to some degree. It is also abundantl y clear that because of th e comp lex it y of
the problem. th ere are no qu ick and easy so lut ions. Therefo re, any seri ous ancmptto
red uce the occ urrence of unfair lendi ng prac ti ces requires a full awareness of all pan ics
invo lved, a cl ear understandin g of the impli cati ons of actions, and a long term
co mmitm ent. The remainder of thi s chapter is devoted to sharing th e thou ght s and
opini ons of th e 12 mortgage mark et ex perts on what ca n and should be done to reduce th e
occurrence of unfa ir lendin g practic es in Utah .

Legislation
Prol1ibitive legislation

11 0 1 effective.

A popul ar sentim ent among co nsum er

advocates across the nati on is that the majo r naw is a lac k of protecti ve legislati on (Engel

& McCoy, 2002; Quercia et al. , 2004).

evcral parti cipants agree that as far as

pro hi biti ve legislation goes, ''There could be room for improvement." But most
parti cipants ei th er ex pli citl y or imp licit ly suggested that attempts to legi slate unfairness
out o f the system have not been very effecti ve, and may have even caused more problems
than it so lved. Several stori es were shared about other states that decid ed to crac k dow n
on un fa ir lendin g with heavy handed legislati on, onl y to find that instead of cooperating,
lend ers just pulled out of th e state and refu sed to do business there any longer (Down ey,
2006) . Parti cipants admitted th at some of the lend ers who left were lik ely perpetrators of
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unfair lend in g. but exp lai ned that the majority were si mpl y serv in g their cl ient ele.
Overly aggressive legis lati on can have many adverse conseq uences, exp lai ned an expert
on regulatory issues:
Well , Georg ia for ex amp le passed an aggress ive predatory lend ing law ... but
that whole segment of th e population was cut off from access to mortgage
lending... So you ca n get into some of th cse areas and rea ll y ha ve a lot of
unintended consequ ences that cause a lot more harm than good. And yo u have to
look for that balance.
This participant went on to ex pl ain that ''W hat most legislators don't understand
is th ey ha ve no control over the financing of mortgages. This is a national market and it's
co ntroll ed by in vestors." In other words it may not even be in the hand s of the mortgage
lending co mpanies; if costs of co mpl yin g wi th aggress ive legislat ion arc too hi gh,
inves tors wil l demand oth er avenu es of in vest in g. In short , it is much too diffic ult to
separat e the unscrupulou s lenders from the legit im ate lend ers based simp ly on prohibiti ve
legislati on because, as described in section li ve o f thi s chapter, most act ions and loan
features are not inherentl y unfair, they simpl y become unfair when they arc misused.
Whil e unfair lend ing is certain ly a prob lem "you can't let the tail wag the dog" as one
participant explained, meanin g that legitimate lending should not be hampered in
attempt s to cu rb unfair lending.
In crease acco!lntahility. A better lega l ap proach, accordin g to the oJfic ials, is to

increase method s of accountabilit y of mark et actors, such as licen sing for le nd ers,
brokers, appraisers, and rea l estate agents. Li censing and registration requirements
officia ll y began in Utah in early 2004, and one co unse lor described that "This has made a
huge difference." Unfortunately li censi ng has not become a pan acea. Though li censi ng
ca n increase acco unt ab ilit y, or the ab ilit y to locate perpetrators of unfair lendin g
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act iviti es, th ere is usuall y lilli e th at can be done as a consequence fo r unacceptab le
practices. A former presi dent of a mortgage com pany exp lained :
All th ey can do is take th eir li ce nse. When th ey find so mebody rea l bad, they take
th eir li cense, but th ey rea ll y ought to be prosec uted . l mea n giving up a li cense
and walking away with '/, of a milli on dollars in mortgage fraud .. . I' d se ll yo u
my li cense for Y. of a mil lion do ll ars. lt's jusl a cost of doin g busin ess for them.
Another method ofaccounlabilily thai has been recentl y introduced to the stale of
Utah for no nd eposi lori es, is the ass ign ment of Principle Lendin g Managers. One lender
exp lained that each nondepository will be required to have a principle lending manager
who is responsib le for each person in the co mpany. The idea is to create greater
incen ti ves fo r co mpani es to poli ce th eir own emp loyees, and to ensure fair lendi ng
practi ces. Thi s is generall y seen as a pos iti ve thing among parti cipants.
Th ere are also cont inuing edu cati on requi rements for lenders in Utah. Thi s
meth od is al so th ought to viewed as a method of increas in g awareness and accountab ility
acco rding to one lender, " Hopefu ll y, licens ing ori ginators and req uiri ng co ntinuing
educa ti on, hopefu ll y that helps people be beller at their job." Yet in creased
acco untab il ity throu gh licensing, Princ ipl e Lending Managers, and continuing educati on,
is onl y eflcctive as long as penalti es for un fa ir lending are adequate. Offi cia ls felt th at
penalties should be harsher, and th erefore more of a deterrent. Wh en asked about
legislati on, one lend er ex pl ained that the ab ilit y to enforce ex istin g laws is import ant:
En forcement. Enforcement of the laws th at we already have on th e book s .... I
think they ought to be slapped wi th the abso lute maximum fin e. You ' ll hit me in
the pocket book and I mi ght pay anenti onto th e rules .... But a $400 fin e isn' t
going to stop me from do ing whatever.
Geographical /racking. An ed uca ti on center manager suggested a lega l provi sion

to all ow regulatory bodies to ben er track geographi ca l patterns of indi ca tors o f unfair
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lendin g, "M o re cogni zant scrutini zati on is needed in areas with rapid growth, and with
more c los in gs. Th ese areas are li kely to ex peri ence hi gher proporti ons o f a buses. " Thi s
wo uld he lp to identify pockets or epid emics o f unfair lend ing, whi ch are o ft en
co ncent rated in such neighborhood s.
Improve viCiim redress systems. Bu t, in order for any method of lender

acco un ta bilit y o r neighborhood ident ificati o n to be effecti ve, co nsumers certainl y need
adeq uate avenues fo r redress . As ex pl ained in the sec ti on on fac tors, even once
consu mers rea li ze they ha ve been victimi Led they o ft en have trou ble ca rryi ng their
inj usti ces to the nex t step o f redress. There are mu ltipl e reasons for thi s, (a) borrowers
arc not awa re o f their ri ghts and what they should do to obtain redress, (b) d ue to
j urisd icti onal bo undari es and lack of awareness, borTowers do not understand where to go
with concerns and com pl aints, and (c) even when borTowers manage to fi le appropriate
co mplai nts, there is often litt le retri buti on that ever comes from it , due to leni ent pen alties
at both the state and federal level s.
Ma ndatO/)' education for harrowers. To avo id ever needin g a system of redress,

severa l part ic ipants argued fo r mandatory co un se ling and edu cati on befo re borrowers are
ever ab le to ent er in to a Joa n. Thi s wo uld serve as a preventative measure, and ideall y
would help the borrowers th emse lves weed out th e more harmful and unethi cal market
ac tors. A form er com munity deve lopment lend er ex plain ed:
It should be mandatory . . . I can' t stress enough that everybody before they get a
mortgage should have homebu yer educati on. Just to know what they' re buying,
how to fi gure out whi ch mortgage is the best, what interest rates are th e best,
po ints, fees, all the different varieti es o f thi ngs that go into acquiring a Joa n. Just
so they have an id ea o f what the whol e process is.
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Bridge jurisdictional howularies. As described previo usly, part ic ipant s

cmphasitcd the rol e that juri sdicti onal gaps play. Several participants mentioned th e
possib il it y of the creati on of special positions for prosecuto rs who co ul d take lega l act ion
on cases of mo rt gage fra ud rega rd less of state j urisdictions in vo lved. How eve r, the best,
and perhaps onl y way to effec ti ve ly brid ge th e ga p acco rdi ng to so urces, is not acti on at
th e state leve l, but rather at the fede ral leve l. On e lender sa id , " I think it would be
reaso nab le to do predatory lendin g laws, bu t in my opinion, they abso lut ely have to be
do ne on a nati onal level." But whatever leg islative acti on is taken in the future to address
unfair lendin g, several parti cipant s offered a subtl e warning similar to one offered by a
l· nd er, "A nything that is done from th e legislati ve side has to be done nat io nally and has
to be done very ca uti ously so yo u do n' t mess up th e system th at has served our co unt ry
so we ll. "

Connn1111ity Support

Com munit y support is a vital com ponent in the fight against unfai r len ling. One
co nsum er advocate related th at word of mouth , and neighborhood support ca n go a long
way to increase awareness o f potenti al borrowers. "Just peop le in general supporting each
other," she ex plai ned whil e also admi tt in g th at thi s is somet hing that is very diffi cult to
contro l or encou rage.
Fair housing commillees. Other reso urces that wou ld be very helpful are fair

housing co mmittees that can act as advocates and resources for victimi zed borrowers.
There have been talks of such co mmitt ees that may ha ve begun to materialize but nothing
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co ncrete has yet come forward. One such commiuee that is in th e works was described
by a co nsum er advocate:
It 's th e Utah Anti-Predatory Lending Initiati ve. It consists of th e Beller Busin ess
Bureau, Community Develop ment Co rporati on of Utah , America First Credit
Uni on, Legal Aid Volu nt eers, Eil ee n Wa lker housing tru st fund, Ut<Jh Mortgage
Lend ers Association , Utah State Uni versity, and AARP vo lunteer corp . Fan nie
Mae is heading it up.
The purpose of th e committee is not onl y to define the problem but also to crea te
a comprehensive so lution to indi vid ual cases. Thi s so luti on includes lega l acti on,
co unselin g and ed ucation , credit rehabilitati on programs, as well as alternati ve fin anci ng
opti ons to help th e borrower get out of th e bad loan as quickl y as poss ibl e. These types
of groups sho w potential but require wid espread coo peration o f non-profit s and lend ers,
and lmgc amoun ts of fundin g.
Neighborhood re virali:arion progmms. An additiona l form of cons um er

support ca n be found in neighborh ood rev itali zation programs targeted specifically at
vulnerab le neighborhoods. Some neighborhood revitali zation commillces already ex ist in
Utah , though on relati ve ly small leve ls, according to one parti cipant who has had
ex peri ence work ing with them. In spite of their small size, the participant felt th at th ey
were very successful at helping rev ita li ze the skills and abi liti es of th e res id ent s in so me
of th e most vuln erable nei ghborhood s on th e west side of th e Salt Lak e Va lley.

Change lndusny and Borro1 ver /n celllives

According to the mort gage mark et expert s, th ere are two things that wou ld help to
put correc t incentives in place. For the industry, it is a more vigoro us self- po li cing of
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their own ac tors. For borrowers. it is gettin g th em interested in educati on for their own
sakes.
Rearra11ge i11dus/ly illcelltives.

Loan officers and brokers lack an incen ti ve to be

co nce rn ed wit h a customer's long term wel l-bein g. That is to say, they Jack the finan cial
in centive. Participants agree that most mortgage mark et actors: appraisers, Joan office rs,
brokers. rea l estate agent s. and others, are very honest and ethical peopl e. and that their
ow n standa rds of ethi cs and moralit y arc enough to ensure interest in a customer' s long
term well bei ng. It is not the average actor that becomes an unfair lender, but rather the
ones who operate strictl y on finan cial incenti ves. Though perhaps sad commentary on
our soc iety, it is apparent that an increasing amount of bad actors are concerned onl y with
finan cial incentives. Parti cipants were not ab le to name spec ifi c ways to rea rrange
incenti ves, but suggest ed that it is possib le, and wo rth in vestigatin g furth er. Perh aps
larger and more frequent penalti es for unfair loans, either deri ved lega ll y or through th e
indu try itsc l f, or perhaps less up front commissions to brokers and more long term
rei\ ard s for stable loans. would ensure a broker's int erest.
According to one lend er, there needs to be more, .. Relation ship se lling," and they
need to be in it , " for the lon g haul. " On e financia l ed ucator explained a relation ship
arrangement in so me ot her states that seemed to help:
There are states th at ha ve a rea ltor-ho me bu yer educat ion relation ship , where,
when [the realtor) ent ers into a co ntract with them he send s them to a home bu yer
class so that th ey' re educated and then once they get into the process they know
what they are doing.
Rearra11ge borrower illcelltives. But lend ers and brokers are not th e on ly ones

who lack incenti ves for long term stabi lity ofloans; borrowers th emselves allow, and
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sometim es even encourage unfair loans just so they ca n get into an unaffordab lc hou se.
More often th an not, these situation s occ ur because bo n·owers are not fu ll y awa re of th e
co nsequences of such loan s, and therefore lack any incenti ve to preven t them.
Co nsum er awareness is lik ely mu ch eas ier to address than chan gin g the incenti ves
of lenders, yet relati ve ly litt le has been cl one co nce rning awareness ca mpai gns for
educatin g borrowers. So far awareness and educat ion campai gns have been largely
headed up by non-profit , and grant funded institutions that are too often und erstaffed, and
unabl e to reac h the hundreds of thousands of potential borrowers who are in need of their
services. As one industry advocate announced nea r the end of th e interview, ··co nsum er
educat ion is paramo unt. "

Financial Edu cation

Since the late eighti es when un fa ir lending practi ces began to proliferate there
have been people poin ti ng fi ngers at others, and bla me and respon sibil ity fo r th e
probl ems cas t in all different directions. The industry, for example, has been crit icized
imm ense ly, a nd perh aps ri ghtl y so because that is the ori gin of the vast majorit y of the
bad acto rs, and perpetrators. Th e leg islature has been blamed as bein g too relaxed or too
ti ght or not quick enough , and not co nce rn ed enough. Aga in th ere is li kely som e truth to
these statements as we ll.
Still , the onl y issue addressed and em phasized by every sin gle part icipant in thi s
stud y as an effecti ve method o f reduction is the arrangement of comprehensive fin ancial
educati on of every consumer. Thi s method of co nsum er protec ti on has of co urse been
recognized in previo us lit erature but has rarely been accen tu ated as the mai n, and best
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method of co nsum er prot ecti on. Yet, acco rding to part icipants, the im po rtance of thi s
method of protectio n ca nnot be overe mph asized. In fac t when one neutral parti cipa nt
was as ked ncar th e end of th e stud y what should be done to redu ce preda tory lending, she
simp ly repli ed, "Education, education , education. "
1/omebuyer education. Homeb uyin g classes are an imm edi ate so luti on, and a
way for consumers to be educated about the process befo re bu ying a home. One
homebu ycr co un se lor asserted ·'N umber one is that consumers need to be ed ucated,
through bu yer education cou rses where predatory lendin g is covered in detail. " But these
courses are often limit ed to a sin gle day, and some fee l th at they simpl y need more tim e
to trul y edu cat e a borrower. A hous in g spec ialist shared, " I th in k it needs a littl e more
tim e .. . We go fast and hard, and try to get everythin g in that is go in g to he lp them. "
Ano ther drawback , particu larl y to home buyer ed ucation , is optim al tim ing of
co urses. Several educators compl ained th at by th e tim e some of the bon·o wers we re
involved in the class, they were so deep into the bu yin g process that man y wo uld n' t
ca nce l th e transaction even if they rea li zed it was a bad loan. On e homebuyer edu cator
ex plain ed that whenever possibl e her organ iza tion tri es to catch peopl e before th ey enter
th e hom e buyin g process:
We wo uld love to have peop le co me just because they' re interested in bu yin g a
home. That's our id ea l home buye r student. . because th ey go in full y armed
and read y, and once yo u ca ll a predatory lender once or twice on what he's doing,
he stops. He stops, beca use he knows you' re educated and he's not goi ng to
mess with you.
' ' "'areness. Borrowers might be more apt to co me in fo r the ed uca ti on if th ey
were more aware of it. For most consum ers it is an awareness prob lem; not onl y
awareness of educational opportunit ies and other reso urces ava ilabl e to th em, but also
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awa reness of the potent ial dangers or pitfal ls they co uld encounter as they enter th e
homebuy ing mark et.
Resources. Educators typi cal ly di rect most of their resourc es to educati on

materi als, leav in g littl e in th e way of adverti sing. An educator described th e limits in
adverti sing:

Beca use we run on gra nts, we don ' t use our money for adve rti si ng very much.
We ' re just now wo rki ng wi th the city to put it in their cit y news letters that go out
with the bi ll s and stuff. And th at 's helpi ng, and every once in a whi le we get a
free space in the loca l newspaper and we usuall y get a lot of ca ll s o n those.
Formal advet1ising in the media was cit ed by others as an ex tremely e ffec tive
tooL but was simpl y too expensive. When asked abo ut reso urces, several co nsum er
ed ucators cited th e U.S. Departm ent of Housin g and Urban Deve lopm ent ( H UD) and
non-profit fo undations. One parti cipant speaking abo ut certain mortgage lending
co mpan ies ex pl ai ned that th ey had th e reso urces to fu nd "world class fi nancial educa ti on
co urses," yet very few were cited as direct so urces o f fund ing for th ese in stituti ons.
However, beca use the industry also stands to ga in th rough havi ng a "mortgage-readyborrower," several parti cipan ts suggest th at the mo rtgage lendin g instituti ons should be
required to direct a porti on of th ei r funds directl y to these non-profits for purposes of
edu catio n.
Shopping. Even if con sum er educa ti on co urses we re ful ly fund ed, and eac h

bo rrower was infom1 ed, ed ucated, and prepared to enter the mot·tgage lending mark et, the
rea l homewo rk wo uld onl y be beginni ng. Co nsumers need to shop, compare and make
informed bu ying dec isions. " If consumers would get th ree good fa ith estimat es prior to
en terin g into a mortgage, th e number of predatory loa ns wo uld go down signifi cant ly, but
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they don ' t," exp lained one allorney. Event hose wit h bad credi t will ha ve optio ns if they
rea ll y take th e tim e to shop. Borrowers wi th bad credit can also work on cred it
rehabi li tati on so that thei r futu re shopping op ti ons become beller. Th e id ea of shopping,
howeve r, is not without it s short co mings and can become com pli cat ed parti cularl y in
cases when netwo rks of un ethi ca l actors, in cluding rea lto rs, arrange the fina ncing in
behalf o f the borrowers.
Financial educcuion in rile schools. As good as homebu yer edu cation may be, the

ex perts admined that it was onl y a temporary so lution to a much larger probl em: a
genera l lack of financial literacy among all Americans, including Utahns. One educator
exc laim ed:
I think everyone should be required to have perso nal fin ance classes before th ey
are out in th e wor ld. It's bas ic educa ti on th at all hi gh school seni ors or j uni ors
should have.
Several part ic ipants mentioned th at beginn ing in 2007, all high schoo l stud ents
wi ll be req ui red to tak e one-half credit of finan cial education. Whil e thi s is certa inl y a
step in th e right direction , it is only the beginn ing, according to one neutral parti cipant ,
beca use finan cial ed ucation should be a core requirement, and in her opini o n it is ··more
import an t th an algebra. " When asked to clarify, th is parti ci pant ex pl ained Lh at student s
arc required Lo know algebra in order to graduat e, but are not required to know how to
ba lance a checkbook, interpret a loa n docum ent, or understand credit. When asked to
rate the impo rtance of fi nancial education thi s ex pert repl ied:
A ten in my opinion on a sca le of one to ten. Everybod y has to go get a job,
everybody is going to have credit o f ome kind somewhere or anot her dow n the
road. Everybody is go in g to have to pay for things, get money and pay for things.
Ba lancing a checkbook is a simpl e thing bu t I got to tell you th ere's a lo t of
peopl e who don ' t have a clue how to do it. I do n't know how you manage in life
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wit hou t ha ving some financial literacy. 1ow Algebra I wo uld say one in ten
might usc it once they get out ofse hoo l, but rea l life fin ances, everybody. "

Consequ ences o f Unfair Lendin g

Determinin g th e co nsequ ences of predatory (unfair) lend in g was not ori gin all y an
objective ol't hi s stud y and was therefore no t inclu ded as a questi on durin g th e interviews.
Nevertheless, participants saw lit to add a great dea l ofinfom1ation co ncern ing thi s topi c.
The fact that participants were able to adequatel y address an additional topi c that was not
ex pli citl y so licit ed serves as an additional verificat ion of the validit y of thi s stud y for
describ ing pred atory lendi ng iss ues. In othe r wo rd s, it is probabl e th at had other
objectives been overlooked such as determining victim characteri sti cs or suggesti ons for
reducti on, th ese topics would have bee n di sc ussed by the intervi ewees an yway. Thi s
sec tion covers the material shared by part icipan ts concernin g the co nsequ ences of unfair
lendi ng.
The consequences of unfair lend ing can be num erou s and far reac hing. The
industry itse lf is hurt by its own actors. First , an indust ry advocate stat ed that ,
"Co nsumers are less comfortable meetin g with th ei r loan officers," and also that,
"They' re intimidated by the process." The who le industry suffers because of th e acti ons
of a few. Wh en approach ed about thi s topic one lender illustrated:
Tha t's why laws are made. That 's why th ere are laws about bank robbery. The
average person doesn' t commit bank robbery but there 's the law fo rbidding bank
robbery because there are a few people who go out and do it. And it 's the same
thing with our mortgage laws. If everybod y wou ld just be straight up, and look
out for the best interest of the customer, the borrower, we wouldn ' t have so many
regulation s.
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Industry actors are not the on ly ones who suffer losses; everyday investors in
mutual fu nds, life insurance policies, retirement fund s and other investm ent s also bear
so me of the losses. One 20-year vetera n of th e market clarifi ed:
So, if fraud is co mmitt ed on a loa n, and th at loa n is so ld to an in vestor, and
beca use of the fraud, at so me point , th at loa n defaults, then it 's that end in vestor
that pot entia ll y tak es the huge hit s. I mean, and those hits can be substanti al.
Fo reclosures and bankru ptc ies are quite freq uent con sequences as a publi c affairs
pccialist related, 'The consequences are numerous and far reachi ng. Foreclosures and
bankruptcies are the most common consequences." Borrowers arc not the onl y ones who
su ffcr losses from foreclosure and bankrup tcy; neighbori ng propert y va lues ca n be
affected , and tax payers, as usua l share some of th e costs. A form er bank er ex pl ained:
There are other economi c impacts whi ch have a rippl e effect. They take away
time from other deve lopm ent s, tak e up staff tim e, sheriffs sa les, bankruptcy
proceedings cost staff tim e and tax payers dollars.
Thi s parti cipant co nt inued to ex pound that the rippl e e ffect described above
event uall y has an effec t on the overall eco no my. The home buying market is vast and
innuential, and problems in that area can pl ay a large role in the rest of the economy.
Unsurprisi ngly much of the costs of unfair lending practices arc passed ri ght back
to th e bOITOwe rs in numerous ways, such as hi gher priced lend in g produ cts, in cludin g
higher int eres t rat es and fees. Yet, as bad as all of th ese co nsequ ences may be. they pale
in compari son to the co nsequences tha t face th e victim s. A lender ex pl ain ed why the
co nseq uences ca n be so ruinou s:
There's probabl y a lot of people th at may have had predatory abuses in buying
groceries, or cars, or furniture, but it's not life changi ng lik e it can be on a
mortgage, because that has a substanti al financ ial effect on peop le.... And I
think that ' s why mortgage lend ing gets so mu ch attent ion.
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Summary

Twelve profess ionals fro m the mortgage lending market in Utah, included four
consum er advocates, four indu stry advoca tes and four neutral parti cipan ts, were asked to
delin c and describe predatory mortgage lendin g. Each subsequ ent summ ar·i zedlind in g
disc ussed is directl y support ed by comm ent s made by the participants.

Defi nition

Predatory lendin g is the act of prey in g on or takin g ad va ntage o f bo rrower
vulnerabiliti es. Whi le there arc subt le differences between the term s predatory, abusive
and fraudul ent lending, parti cipants frequ entl y used th ese terms int erchan geab ly. Thi s
im pli es that partic ipants used th e term predatory lending not onl y fo r di scuss in g targeted
acts or preyin g on vulnerabiliti es, but as an enco mpassing term fo r all lending abuses,
including ill egal actions. Simil arl y, the term '·predatory lender" was not always used to
refer to an actual lender but included an y mo rtgage market actor such as an appraiser, a
real estate agent , a servicer, or anyone who earn s prolits in th e mortgage lending market.
Predatory lending as a voca bulary term in th e mortgage market is frequ ently
mi sund erstood because it regul arl y carri es cert ain stigmas and sli ghtl y diffe rent meanings
and connotati ons depending on the perceptions of th e user of the term . The imp lica ti on is
that th e term "predatory lendin g" is actuall y an obstacle to common understand ing, and
should therefore be di scarded and replaced with another, more suitable term , th at aid s
co mmon und erstand in g instead o f becoming a hindrance.
Wh ile th e participants did not ex pl icit ly suggest a rep lacement term, the less
stigmati ted and more encompass in g phrase of ''unfair lending" was used on severa l
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occas ions by partic ipants to refe r to predatory, abu sive and fraud ul ent acts. Therefore.
this \las the substi tu te term used throughout the remainder of th is paper. Simi larl y, the
term "actor' ' or " bad acto r" was used in place of th e term " lend er," to includ e all poss ibl e
perpetrators of un fair lending.
Us in g ev id ence quoted by participants it was determine that unfl1ir lending is one
or more of the following: (a) a tra nsaction without a fidu ciary dut y or having th e
borrowe r's best interest in mind , (b) a transac tion the borrower does not com pl etely
und erstand for an y reaso n includ ing age, language barrier or lack of fin ancial savvy,
(c) a transac ti on that has no beneficial use o r results in ha1111 to the borrowe r, (d) a loan
that deli vers the lender excess ive profit s, and (e) a loan that the borrower does not have
th e ab ilit y to repa y.
Beca use thi s definition lacks meas urab ilit y, it was suppl emented by further
ev id ence offe red by the ex perts in thi s stud y. Six additional top ics we re di sc ussed by the
part icipa nt s a nd helped to furth er defi ne and desc ribe unfair mortgage lending.

Mag11 iwde

Unfair lending prac ti ces have been known to occur in many places throughout th e
state, but have been specifi ca ll y id en tifi ed in St. Geo rge, the west sid e of Sa lt Lake
Va ll ey, West Va ll ey Cit y, Ogd en, and Sandy, and th e entire Wasatch Front. Nin e of th e
I 2 participams fe ll that unfair lendin g is a large and increasi ng problem in Utah. Many
of t he participants consid ered forec losure, bankruptcy, and defa ult rates as additional
ind icato rs of unfai r lend ing prac tices, and beca use Utah has hi gh rates in all of these areas
it can be concl uded that unfair lending is also very widesp read.
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l'iclim Cllllrac/erislics

The victims of unfair lendin g practi ces are usual ly, but not always borrowers.
Lend ers and investors can also be victims, and occas ion all y even a co-conspirator in a
fraudul ent loa n can becom e a seco ndary victim. Borrowers usuall y suffer much more
seve re losses than other types of victim s, and justifi ab ly received more atte nti on of th e
parti cipants.
Characteri stics of vulnerabl e borrowers were separated into four areas: perso nal
attributes, emotion al characteristi cs, financial characteristics, and general ability to
und ersta nd home loan transacti ons. Common personal anributes of victi ms were yo ung,
elderly, minorit y, non-Engli sh speaking, overly-tru stin g, somewhat irresponsibl e, and
could potenti all y be anyone. Emotio nal characteri stics of victims in clud ed fee lin gs of

clcspcrnlion, desire for instant grali fication , and real or perceived pressures from peers
and lend ers to go throu gh with loan s. Financia l characterist ics includ ed a bad credit
hi sto ry, an instan t credit mental it y, low incom e, no savi ngs, large amo unt s o f equit y in a
home, and poor finan cial literacy sk ill s. Utah borrowers also general ly lack the
understandin g, ex perience and education needed to undertake the complexi ti es in volved
in a hom e loa n transac ti on.

rac/Ors

There were four genera l categori es fo r the facto rs and cond iti ons that fo stered the
ex istence of unfair lend ing in Utah: industry, publi c, lega l, and overl app ing factors.
Industry fac tors included mark et compl ex ity, hi gh leve ls of market activi ty, the
preva lence of bad actors, and a system that promotes conflictin g incenti ves. Facto rs
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affectin g the pub li c as potent ial borrowers included a language barri er, in stant cred it
mentality, lack of com munity reso urces, press ure for homeownership, a trusting nature,
lack of education , lack of education opportuni ti es and co nsum er awa reness, and hi gh
forec losu re and defau lt rates with co rrespondin g negati ve effects on credit. Though
participan ts were di vided on whether Utah 's lega l system was too relaxed o r too
restrictive, the majorit y agreed that jurisdicti ona l issues created a major prob lem in
addressi ng unfair lending, and that enforcement an d effecti veness of penalti es co uld also
be improved. Addit ional facto rs that innuenced all areas include a lack or acco un tabi li ty
on al l sides of mortgage transac tions, obstac les for redress for victims, scarce resources
for effecti ve education and prosec ution, pressure to deli ver a transacti on and the lac k of a
co mm on und erstandin g o f what unfa ir lending ent ai ls.

Practices

The commo n practi ces that are in vo lved in unfair lend ing were divided between
un fa ir ac ti ons, and unfair loan features. Unfai r ac ti ons included I00% fin ancin g, th e 3yea r cyc le of employment , bait and sw itch, can ni ba li sm or minoriti es abus ing min ori ties,
criminal conduct, eq uit y based lendin g, mi sleadin g information , sc heme to stea l, multipl e
sa lary qualification, nippin g, abu sive servicin g, steerin g, unaffordabl e lending, preying
on vulnerabi liti es, abusive netwo rking, and over-appraisi ng. Unfair loa n features
included adj ustable rate mortgages, teaser rates, balloon payments, cred it in surance,
finan ces fees, hidden charges, hi gh fees, hi gh interest rates, interest onl y loa ns, and
prepayment penalti es.
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Ret!ucrio11
Methods or ideas for reducing unfair lend in g in Utah were contrib uted free ly by
participants, most of whi ch referenced a change to one or more of the factors, practi ces or
characteri sti cs prev iously menti oned.
Legislation. Actor acco unt ab il ity shou ld be in creased thro ugh furth er licensing
and con tinuin g educatio n. Steps the state has already taken to li cense and to requi re
Princi pl e Le nding Managers, were pos iti ve moves. Penalti es need to be more severe, in
order to be a n adeq uate det errent. Tracking of the geographi ca l paltern o f areas wi th fa st
growth and hi gh number of closi ngs wo uld be producti ve. Effec ti veness and awareness
of systems of lega l red ress for consu mers needs vas t improvement. Mandato ry edu cation
fo r borrowers befo re ent ering a loa n tran sac tion was enco uraged. Juri sdi cti onal gaps
between the Division of Rea l Es tate, Departm ent of Financial Instituti ons, and ot her
regu latory bod ies in vo lved in home-based lend ing, need to be addressed. This issue
needs to eventua ll y be addressed at the fede ral leve l, beca use state laws have no
jurisdi cti on over nati onal fi nancia l en ti ties.
Collll/lllllity Support. Communit y support is needed in grea ter abunda nce.

Consumer support co uld possib le co me in th e form of consum er advocacy groups,
neighborh ood rev ita lization programs, or fundin g.
111centives. Th e industry needs to make more efforts to ensure custo mer
sa ti sfacti on and long term relat ions th ro ugh estab lishing an effecti ve hot line fo r consu mer
feedback, acco untabil ity and indu stry imposed penalt ies on bad ac tors, and stronger
lender-c lien t relationships. Borrowers also need an incenti ve for getting th emselves
ed ucated and aware of poten ti al da ngers in the mortgage lendi ng market.
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Finan cial edu cation. Education is paramount, and cannot be overem phas ized.

Homcbuyer education is an effecti ve so urce for borrower ed ucatio n, but classes are not
ab le to reach the hundreds of thousands of bo rrowers who need it. Funding for these
classes and lor ad verti sin g is needed, parti c ul arl y from the indu stry it se lf beca use
indust ry actors also stand to benefit from hav ing mortgage ready borrowers. Timing of
homcbuyer ed ucation needs to be addressed, beca use once the consumer has al ready
en tered the bu yin g process it is usua lly too late. Awareness needs to be increased, not
on ly ofhom ebu ye r classes, but also of the va lue of th e education as a protec ti on from
poten tia l dangers they ca n enco unter in th e mo rtgage lending market. Co nsum ers also
need to be taught how to shop effec ti ve ly for a good dea l in the mortgage lending market,
and need to learn how to properl y rehab ilitate and maintain good cred it hi stori es.
In spite ora llthe benefits of homebuycr education , it is merely a temporary
so luti on to a much bigger prob lem, th e lack of financia l li teracy among Utah ns and
Americans in general. Sound financia l educati on is a long neglected, yet vitall y needed
subj ect, and is fa r more im portant than even algeb ra and other basic co urses because
c,·eryonc wi ll use it. It is apparent that soc iety in general is paying for thei r lack of
finan cial preparation through epid emi cs of vict imi zed cons um ers in every market , not
just th e home bu yin g market. Utah has made steps to includ e a half of a cred it of
financial education in the hi gh schoo ls, but this is on ly a small step in th e right directi on.
Elementa ry school s, junior hi gh sc hoo ls, co ll eges, and com munit ies need to offer more
classes, and consumers need to be made aware o f their importance.
Co nce rning ideas for reduction ofunlitir lend ing one neutra l parti cipant
summari zed:
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Well , th ere 's two ways you can come at th is, thi s way, where peopl e have a full
array o f opport uniti es and opt ions for them, and are educated as to how to make
co rrect choices. The oth er, whi ch some states advocate and some consu mer
groups advocate is yo u just say, "No we are go ing to dec id e for yo u what loa ns
you can make. We are go ing to take th e judgment away from yo u and were go ing
to limit lending to just thi s very narrow area, and presc ribe all th e term s and that 's
where credit wi ll res ide, and it wo n' t be avai labl e any where else. And I think
th at's a lousy way to approac h thi s.... I think thi s ed ucati on should be in th e
seco ndary schoo ls. It should be a manda tory hi gh school co urse.

Consequences of Unfair Leudiug
The co nsequ ences of unfai r lending can be numerous and fa r reach in g. The
industry, and investo rs bear so me of the losses of unfa ir loans. Much of these costs arc
actua ll y passed ri ght back to the consum ers in the form hi gher pri ces on loan produc ts,
though fo rec los ures and bankruptcies can have a rippl e effec t through th e e ntire
economy. Of course, th e co nsequences to th e indi vidual borrower arc oft en mu ch wo rse
and much more devastating. Victims often ex peri ence default, foreclosure and
bankrupt cy as a result of unfair loans.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSS IO

This chapter will hi ghli ght the key findings of the data and discuss th e similariti es
and differences of these findin gs and current lit erature on the subj ect. Impli ca tion s of the
key lindings wi ll then be di sc ussed fo llowed by the limitations of this tud y. Fin all y,
suggest ions for fut ure research wi ll be offered.

Key Find in gs

The in ten t of thi s secti on is not to directl y co mpare every findin g from th e data to
those in th e lit erature, but rath er to di sc uss the key findings of th e data and how they
contradi ct or support findin gs in current lit erature. Add itionall y, beca use data were
specific to Utah and most cu rrent literat ure is nat ionall y representative, differences in
data and li terature do not necessa ril y impl y con tradi ctions, but may simp ly represent
differences in geograp hi ca l loca tion.

Definition

Parti cipant s expl icitl y defi ned predat ory mo rtgage lending as targeted practices
that int entional ly ex pl o it the vu lnerabi liti es of borrowers. Impl icitl y, or in co mmon use,
participan ts used predatory mo rt gage lending to refer to a much wid er range of practi ces
includin g all instances of mortgage lending abuse and fraud . This inconsistency between
defin it ion and co mmon use suggest that th e term predatory lendin g is misund erstood, or
rat her lack s a common und erstanding. Its meani ng is often assoc iated with the
percept ions of those who usc it, and ca n so meti mes carry negative conno tati ons, attack ing
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impli ca ti ons, or sti gma. Th e conclusion is that th e term predatory lending serves as more
of an obstacle to common understand in g, than as a too l and shou ld therefore be repl aced
with another, more encom pass ing, and less sti gmat ized term.
The term unfair lendin g was used throughout th e rema ind er o f th e stud y to refe r to
all instances of predatory, ab usive, fra udulent and harmful lending, though thi s term is
not a defi nit ive replacement. Unfair lend in g as de fin ed by parti cipant s is one or more of
the fo ll ow in g: (a) a transaction without a fiduciary dut y or having the borrower's best
interes t in mind, (b) a transaction the bo rrower does not co mpl etely understand for any
reason includin g age, language barrier or lack of financi al savvy, (c) any transacti on that
has no benefi cia l use or resu lt s in harm to the borrower, (d) any loa n th at deli vers the
lend er excess ive profits, and (e) any loa n th at th e borrower does not have th e abilit y to
repay. Thi s de finiti on is not overtly meas urabl e; th erefo re, th e subsequ ent secti ons
convey more detail ed information offered by participants th at is mo re eas il y measured.
None o f the relevant lit eratu re to thi s point has suggested th at the term predatory
lend ing itse lf was an obstac le to achi ev ing common understandin g. Thi s is ind eed a new
and unforeseen result th at co uld ultimately prove to be very useful in the goa l to reach
co mm on understanding. Add itiona ll y, onl y a few studi es have attempted to defin e
predatory/unfa ir lendin g, and when co mp ared to the detail and clarit y of th e definiti on
deri ved in thi s stud y, they certa inl y appear to be lacki ng (Engel & McCoy, 2002; U.S.
Department of Hou sing, 2000).
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Mag11it 11de ojPredatorv Le11di11g ill Uta II
Participa nts suggcstedth atthe magn itud e or ex tent of unfair lendin g in Utah is
direc tl y indi cated by th e defa ult, fo rec losure, and ba nkruptcy rates in th e state. Beca use
Utah has rank ed in th e top ten in each of th ese ca tegories over th e last several years, thi s
suggests that un fair lending in Utah is widespread and rampant (AB I, 2004; Federal
Burea u of Invest igation, 2005; Mi tche ll , 2003). However, when a ked directl y
respondent comments we re mi xed, wi th so me saying that unfai r lend ing was preva len t
and others sayin g that it was not.

Victim Cilaracteristics
Borrowers are not th e onl y victim s of unfair lendin g. In vestors, th e indu stry
itse lf, and so metim es eve n co-co nspirators in fraud atlempts can beco me victimi zed to a
degree. In the literat ure, borrowers are nearly always seen as th e so le victims in un fai r
lending (Ca lem et al. , 2004; Engel & McCoy, 2002; Lord , 2005; Zimm erm an et al. ,
2002). It is tru e, however, th at th e other vic tim s do not suffe r the same direct and
staggerin g losses that bo rrowers ofien face, and therefore j ustifi ab ly, th e literature and
most of the co mm ents of part icipants were cen tered on borrowers as the victi ms.
Simi lar to report s in lit erature, borrowers are more vulnerab le du e to certain
perso nal and financial attribut es, such as bein g eld erl y, minorit y, low- income or bad
credit (New man & Wyly, 2002; Zimmerman et al., 2002). Unlike th e li teratu re,
parti cipants also ex plained that borrowers are genera lly unprepared menta ll y and
emoti onall y to enter hom e loan transacti ons. They are oft en emot ionally unsteady
because of the magnitude of the transaction , and the thril l of instant gratifi cation th rough
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cred it. Additi ona ll y, home loan transac ti ons o ft en coi ncide with major life changes such
as a marriage, new job, and a change in fr ie nd s and neighbo rs, and others that ca n
emoti onall y impair a borrower's judgment. Along with nuct uat ing emotions, bo rrowers
are frequently unprepared mentall y to ent er· a home loa n tran sac ti on. The co mpl ex iti es
invo lved in a transaction, particul arl y in disc los ures an d other paper work, requi re all but
the most dedicated and in form ed to place tru st in the loan officer or broker, which
unfortunately leaves them open to possibi liti es of ab use.

Factors That Foster Predato1y Leudiug

Literature oft en focuses on the unethi ca l and irrespon sibl e market ac tors th at are
the perpetrators in cases of unfair lendin g (E nge l &McCoy, 2002). Whi le partic ipant s
ce rt ainl y agr·ee, they also indi ca ted th at irrespo nsibi lit y and lack of accountabili ty persists
on both sides of a transaction. Just as mark et actors are too wil ling to forsake thei r ethics
to make quick profi ts, borrowers are too will ing to tru st thei r fin ancial futures to so me
other part y th an themse lves. Participants related that un ethi ca l market acto rs are
currentl y diffic ult to hold accoun tab le for unfair practices, and even those who are held
liable face lenient penalti es th at do not act as suffi cient deterrents of future act ions by
them or oth ers. According to parti ci pants, borrowers th emselves also frequ ently try to
avo id acco unt ab ility. Parti cipant s exp lain ed that most " unfair," "predatory," or "ab usive"
acts that occu r to victim s are actuall y fully disclosed in the paper work of the transacti on
and borrowers simpl y fa il to read them, or fail to seek help if the materi al is over thei r
heads, but instead leave th e respons ibilit y of ensurin g fair transacti ons to th e broker or
lender.
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The mort gage lendin g market is compl ex and vast, and nearl y all parti es invo lved
in a mortgage transac ti on, at one point or another, face conflicting incenti ves (Kim-Sung

& Herma nso n, 2003 , U. S. Department of Housing 2000). According to parti cipants these
co nfli cting incentives often res ult in a trad eoff of long term we ll being for more
imm ediate, short term benefit s. In oth er words, both borrowers and lenders ha ve
incentives to forsake the long-tcrrn stabilit y of loans for more immed iate benefit s such as
higher co mmi ssi ons, or large stuns of instant credit. While parti cipants lament that
mark et structure, legal j uri sdi ctions, and avenu es of vict im redress, are comp lex and full
of contradi ctin g incenti ves, they suggest that cooperati on is sti ll possi bl e. Whil e
lit erature does address each o f th ese iss ues to so me ex tent, they are not emphas ized as
th ey were by participants (Engel & McCoy, 2002; Lord, 2005 ; Sturdevant & Brenn an,
1999).

Practices

According to literature, unfai r loans arc the res ult of harmfu l acts or practi ces
(S turd eva nt & Brennan, 1999). What the literature does not full y ex plai n is that loan
features are not in and of th emse lves unfair, predatory, or abusive, but rather become
unfair onl y when misu sed. The failure to mak e, or adequately emph as ize thi s distin cti on
has led man y aggress ive state legis latures to ban certain lending features (Lord , 2005;
Quercia et al., 2003). Aggress ive banning, or prohibitive legi slat ion has had adverse
consequ ences in some states, including a lack of competition among lend ers and
co nsequ entl y, a lack of lending op ti ons for borrowers (Downey & Barr, 2006). Overl y
strict leg islation would have the sa me effect that usury rate restri ction s had in the earl y
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1980' s, whi ch si mul ta neo usly hampered th e lend ing busin ess, and li mited the opt ions of
borrowe rs, res ulti ng in pri me imerest rates th at were nea rl y quadru ple the current 2006
rate. Parti ci pants have emph as ized th at instead of revertin g to pre-1 980's co nd iti ons,
leg islati on should protec t co nsum ers whil e all ow ing legitimate bu sin ess to nou ri sh, and
th at there are leg itim ate uses for many loan features as long as th ey are used under the
right circum sta nces. Th e spec i fi e act ions and loan fea tures th at part icipa lll s sa id they
have seen in Utah, are not much di fferent fmm those in the li teratu re (E nge l & McCoy,
2002 ; Sturdevant & Brennan).

Redu ction of Pred({[on • Mortgage Lending

Th e lit erature cert ainl y suggested leg islati on as a solu tio n to un fa ir mort gage
lendin g, however, most suggesti o ns allu ded to prohibiti ve legislati on, or th e bannin g of
spec i fi e loan features that are used to abuse borrowers (Engel & McCoy, 2002; Quercia
et al. , 2004). Participant s of thi s study gene rall y supported a more free ma rket appmac h
where market actors and borrowe rs are more acco untable for their own acti ons, but stil l
able to make the ir ow n dec isions. The reaso ns for thi s feeli ng, di scussed prev iously,
were that it all ows more opt io ns to th e co nsum er, and all ows legiti mate bu siness to
prosper. Th e key to thi s app roach is to reduce ex isting inform ati on asymm etri es, or to
insure perfec t inform ati on and full acco unt ab ility on bot h sides of the transacti on.
Li censing, increased penalt ies, mo re efficient vic ti m redress, manda tory borrower
educati on, and bri dging j urisdi cti onal boundari es were seen as methods of reduction that
were foc used more on acco unt abilit y and responsib ili ty.
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Similar to research fi ndings elsewhere, participants suggested increased
coopera ti on between non-profit ed ucators and finan cial instituti ons (U.S. Departm ent on
Housin g, 2000). However, parti cip ants elaborated th at th e industry needs incent ives to
loc us more on long term customer relati ons and we ll -bei ng. Th e findin gs of th e prese nt
stud y add to ex ist ing lit erat ure wi th suggest ions of co nsumer advocacy groups and
neighborhood rev itali zation commillccs as ways to increase borrower awareness and
responsi bil ity.
Much o f the literature suggests so me so rt of education for borrowe rs, but these
suggestio ns are nearl y always secondary to suggest ions for increased legislat ion (E ngel &
McCoy; Lo rd, 2005). Participants in thi s stud y emphasized that th e prim ary method of
reducing th e occu rrence of unfair lending is th rough education , and whil e certain ly
important, legislati on is onl y second ary. Thi s is consistent with the parti cipants' views o r
a genera l free market allitudc.
Homcbuyer ed uca ti on co urses are encou raged by parti cipant s as a short term
remed y, as similarl y echoed in the literaiUre (Lo rd , 2005). However, th e lo ng term
so luti on accordi ng to the participants is regular and frequent fin ancial ed ucation courses
in th e secondary school s, co ll eges, and co mmuniti es, so methin g that is bare ly di sc ussed
in lit erature (E nge l & McCoy, 2002).

Consequences of Predarory Lending

The indu stry and investors oft en bear so me losses caused by unfai r lending, but
the large losses are incurred by individual borrowers. Their finan cial futures can be
u11crl y des troyed by un fa ir lend ing practices. As victi m tallies ri se, the more and more
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their losses are felt in the rest of the econom y beca use hi gh forec losure and bankruptcy
rat es increase the cost of credit , and facilitat e the usc tax payer do ll ars th at co uld
otherw ise be saved . Th e literatu re alludes to simil ar cost anal yses, though not
spec ifi cal ly for Utah (Stein, 200 1).

Implicati ons

A ke y imp li cation of thi s study is th at the term predatory lending should be
replaced with a more encompassi ng, and less sti gmati zed term. At th e very least, it
shoul d be understood by all parti es in vo lved that predatory lendi ng ca n refer to all
instances of unfair lending and not onl y tho se that are targeted, and th at the perpetrator
ca n be any mortgage actor not just a lender. Thi s stud y used the term "unfair lendin g,"
and "actor" in the place of''predato ry lendin g" and " lend er" to emphasize the need for
these changes. However, there is not co nclusive ev id ence th at these term s are th e most
suitable repl acements because the top ic o f repl acement terms was not addressed in thi s
researc h.
Given the wea lth of new data suggested by the parti cipant s in thi s stud y, there are
num erou s impl icati ons for multipl e parti es in th e stat e. These are di sc ussed nex t, th ough
parti cipants have related th at any effec ti ve so lu tion to unfair lendin g will be multifaceted,
and require the cooperation and long term co mmitm ent of all part ies discussed below.

Consumer Educmion
IJOJTo•vers. A key findi ng of thi s st ud y is th at consum ers need to be full y
responsibl e for ensuring benefi cial transac tion s, beca use th ey ca nnot rely on the mark et
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ac tors to do th is for th em. Undoubtedl y the so luti on to unfair lendin g is mullifaceted and
req uires legislation, and industry co rrec ti ons, but hundreds of thousands of exam pl es of
unfai r lending ha ve proven that th e market ca n be treacherous and th at th e borrower
cann ot trust hi s finan cia l future to anyone but him sc l f.
Th is is not to impl y that eac h borrower needs to become an ex pert in th e mortgage
lend in g mark et, but it does mean that the borrower should be aware of unfair lending to
the point that he knows of helpful resources, and places to go with spec ifi c questi ons on a
loan. An addit ional possib il it y is th e requirement o f a third part y attorn ey or mortgage
lending pro fess ional, with incenti ves to act compl etely in the best interest of the
borrowe r, to rev iew mortgage docum ent s, and ensure borrower und erstanding befo re
signin g. Thi s wo uld ce rtainl y add to th e monetary cost of closing, but given the rampant
amoun ts of abu se currentl y present in the mark et, thi s wo uld likely red uce the rea l total
costs of borrowing to consumers. Armed with full inform at ion and edu cated alli es,
borrowe rs ha ve th e potenti al to change th e saying from "caveat emptor" (let the bu yer
beware) to "caveat venditor" (let the se ll er beware).
Consumer educators. Co nsum er educators need to continue doing what th ey do
best: edu cate. The value of th ese services has bee n grea tl y underemphasized in the pas t
and too o ft en tak en for gran ted. Th e parti cipants of this study ha ve placed a great dea l of
trust and responsi bility in the hand s of th ese educators. Additional sources of funding
need to be so ught out parti cul arly from the lenders th emse lves who stand to ga in from
hav in g mortgage-ready borrowers, and add iti onal quali lied ed uca tors are certainl y needed
throughout th e state.
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Cons umer advoccues. The duty of co nsumer advocates is to support the
multifaceted so lution. Thi s entails ex tensive lobbying of the legislature for changes in
the financ ial education opportunities in the sc hoo ls and co mmunities, and of funding for
such programs. It also includ es lobbying for chan ges in the code to increase penalti es or
perpetrat ors. for requirin g mandat ory education for borrowers, and for regulati ons that
can bridge the jurisdictional gaps in the regul ato ry bodies of the state and nation. It also
incl udes community support and community action groups, as well as good indu stry
relat ions.

Potier Implications
lndusu y. The indu stry as a whol e needs to und ersta nd that it also suffers from the
hands of a few o f its own acto rs. For its own good the industry should lake a good hard
look at th e structure of incentives of it s actors and do what it can to ensure that these
actors will pu rsue the long-term stabi lit y of th eir loa n products. Eve ryone win s when the
transac ti on is fa ir and effi cient. The ind ustry should also vo luntaril y offer finan cial
support to fund financial ed uca ti on co urses for both chi ldren and adults.
Legislators and regulators. A key goa l of further legi slati on is to increase
accou ntabilit y, and not to prohibit spec ific loan features. This ca n be done through
effi cient li cens in g, increased penalties, and mandatory borrower ed ucatio n.
It is essential that jurisdictional boundaries be bridged at the national level. As
the current structure of mortgage regulation operates, states have very li tt le power in
assuring th at all elements of the mortgage market are e ffect ively monito red, such as
second mortgages, or hom e improvement loans. For exampl e, finan cial institutions th at
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arc not based in Utah are not subj ec t to the laws governing Utah. Instead they arc held
acco un table by the state where th e com panies headquart ers are located, whi ch may be a
much more lenient state, as far as mortgage regul ation s go. Stat es, there fore, have
mi spl aced in centi ves to all ow more leni ent legislati on in order to draw th e headqua rters
of larger businesses to the state, whi ch ultim ately in creases state revenu e throu gh taxes.
The residents of the state wi ll likely suffer from un fa ir lendin g pract ices, but not
signifi ca ntly more than if the headquarters were located in another state, and th e co mpany
co nti nued to operate in the state by simpl y bypass ing their laws. This is a very simil ar
scenario to the ex porting of interest rates of cred it card co mpani es located in South
Dako ta and Delaware. Some of th e bi gger, more widel y dispersed fi nancia l in stitution s
arc able to entirely escape state j uri sdi cti on all togeth er, and are onl y monit ored by
fede ral regul ators, who lack suffici ent resottrces to c iTecti ve ly monitor mort gage lendin g
ac ross the enti re nation.
Aven ues for victim redress arc also severely inadequate. A cruc ial role of th e
gove rnmen t is to provide support to it s cit izens act as an advocate on behalf of it s ci ti zens
who are otherwise powerl ess. The imp lementati on of an ombudsman o ffi ce that wo rks
on behalf of consumers is a poss ibi lit y. It is lik ely, however, th at th e issue of victim
redress cannot be full y addressed unti I juri sdictional issues are sort ed ou t.
An appropriate ro le for the governmen t in a free market economy such as
support ed by th e participants, is to ensure pe rfect informatio n on bot h sides o f a
transac ti on. A crucial element in the effic iency o f mortgage tran sacti ons is a financ iall y
ed ucated consum er, however, current borrowers face ex treme defi ci ts of th e necessary
info rmati on needed to ensure fa ir tran sact ions. It is, th erefore, th e governm ent's
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responsibi lity to ens ure

finan c ialli te r~cy

of its ci ti zens. Thi s is something that sta te

legis latu res ca n immed iately pursue, as opposed to waiting for juri sdictional issues to be
wo rkin g ou t.

The legislature needs to appropriate more fund in g and direc t invol vement in th e
administration of finan cial ed ucati on. The dut y of finan cial education ca n no longer be
the so le responsibility of non-p rofi t organi zati ons but shoul d be the duty of the state and
fede ral governm ents du e to the urgent and importalll nature of thi s need. Funding of such
ed uca ti on program s should co me at least partiall y fro m the lenders th emse lves, because
th ey arc primary benefi ciaries of fa ir transacti ons.
Scltoo/ hoards. Over the last 20 yea rs, legislators have all owed the introduct ion

of a mo re open econom y by reducin g usury rat es and li mitations on who ca n becom e
lenders. The tremendou s fin ancial cri ses that are currentl y abound in the financi al
markets ac ross the United States have come about beca use the legi slature failed to
simu ltan eo us ly provide avenu es for fin ancial literacy education of Am eri ca n cit izens.
Without fina ncial educat ion co nsum ers are e ffec ti ve ly un arm ed in a free market, and
can not fun cti on opt imally beca use they lack information and understanding needed to
mak e ad va ntageo us bu ying decision s. Participants have em ph asi zed that financi al
ed ucati on is essential for surviva l in tocla y's credit based society, and is so mething that
everyo ne wil l use almost every cl ay of their lives. When put into perspec ti ve, finan cial
education is ind eed "more important th an algeb ra."
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Limitation s of the Study

As in all qualitati ve studies, it canno t be assum ed that the opi ni ons of these twelve
parti cipan ts necessa rily represen t th e opinions of th e entire lending com munit y of Utah
bec au se th ey do not constitute a represe nt ativ e samp le of the popula tion or· th e industry.
However, th e purpose of th is stud y was to defin e and describe preda tory lending through
the eyes of a handful of everyday wi tnesses. In ot her words, thi s is an exp loratory stud y
to be bu ilt upon , and is not a conclu sive stud y of mortgage lending practices.
Chai n, or snowball sa mplin g, was used in this study, wh ich may ha ve introd uced
cert ain biases of th e resea rchers, who mad e the initial sa mpli ng decision , a nd of
parti ci pants who mad e the additio nal referrals. In addition, the assignment of parti cipants
to the ca tego ri es of consumer advocate, industry advocate, and neut ra l pa rti cipant was
mad e mostl y on the basis of how part icipant s identifi ed themse lves. How well these
percepti ons wo uld match those of oth ers is unknown . However, the stud y's va lidit y and
reliabilit y were strength ened using pilot interv iews, continuing feedback from
parti ci pant s o n research questi ons, member check s on interview con tent to ensure
accurate meaning, and th e use o f assistant researchers to verify data cod in g and research
des ign.
It is appropriate in qualitati ve wo rk s such as thi s to present a bri ef"descript ion of
my pot ent ia l biases as the primary researc her and fac il itato r in thi s research. It sho uld be
obvious that as a student of consumer sc iences I ha ve a natural tendency to side wi th the
co nsum er, and I co nsider myself to be an acti ve consumer advocate. In addition to thi s
trainin g as a consumer scien ti st, I also have a background in genera l eco nomic theory. I
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feel thi s unique comb ination of training has given me a somewhat obj ecti ve view of th is
issue. and I ca n tru thfull y say th at I have made every attempt to exam in e the iss ue of
unfair (predatory) lendin g from all perspecti ves.
I und erstand as on e parti cip an t put it , that "'b usinesses have to make money, they
arc not philanthropic. They arc in bu sin ess to make money that 's why th ey are ca lled
bu sin esses." I also understand that one ass umption in economic theory is th at both th e
bu yer and the se ll er (o r borrower and lender in thi s case) have perfect or abso lu te
infonnation and are dri ve n by in visible mark et forces to make the most fair, or erfi cient
exchange possi bl e. However, th e requirement of perfect informati on is oflen absent in
th e rea l wo rld and in effici ent transac tions occ ur every da y, as seen in th e cases with
unfair. or as I like to say, in effi cient lendin g.
Co min g into thi s proj ec t I initi all y made the same ass umptions as ca n be found in
much of the literature on predatory lendin g: that the onl y way to riel the nati on o f th ese
ine rfi cient transacti ons was through tough and un yield ing legi slation. Aft er man y months
of rev iew ing relevant literatu re, and even throu gh th e final stages of thi s research project,
I con tinued to fu ll y ex pect th e results of thi s stud y to reach th e sa me co nclu sion as th e
lit erature. During th e data co ll ecti on phase of thi s stud y I began to recogni ze th at the
respon ses of my participants did not entirely su pport thi s view, and that legislation was
not the on ly answer, and not even the prim ary answer. Near the fin al stages of data
co ll ec ti on, I slow ly began to reali ze that my initi al assumptions were not in lin e wi th the
res t of my economic training th at teac hes that if market ineffic iency is present it is eith er
due to imperfect information or govern ment in vo lvement' At thi s point it beca me
apparen t to me th at it was the form er, though governm ent interventi on around the cou ntry
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has been increasing over the last six to seven years, wi th mixed results (Downey & Barr,
2006).

Thi s is not to say that I bel ieve the govern ment shou ld play no ro le at al l in th e
iss ue of unfair lend in g, but I do see the logic of the co nclusions of this resea rch; namely,
th at litt le good can co me through prohibiti o n of spec ifi c practi ces or loa n fea tures th at are
not in and of themselves predatory, because they are only predatory when they are
misused. Doing so wo uld be to simpl y revert to pre- 1986 lend in g market conditi ons,

where the now or money was greatl y impeded. A more usefu l ro le fo r the governm ent,
in my opinion, and as participants of thi s st udy suggested , is to li cense, track, and
pub lici ze th e ac ti ons of the mark et, so th at all borrowers and indu stry ac tors mi ght be
"" '!IFe o f. th e co nseque nces of un fa ir lendin g.

From the mid 1980s to the prese nt , the governm ent has continual ly introd uced
more relaxed lendin g policies with the hope that American lend ing businesses ca n
become more profitable. Theo retically there is nothin g wrong with thi s so rt of open
eco nomi c policy. However in practi ce, consum ers suddenly have new freedo ms, bu t lack
th e sk ill s req uired to mak e responsible decisions. The government should have also
ensured full financia l literacy of its citi zens before it ever decided to relax lendi ng
standard s. Tho ugh certainly pas t du e, th e governm ent shou ld now step up to its role of
ensurin g fair ma rkets, an d ens ure that eac h American citi zen has th e oppo rtunit y to learn
th e sk ills necessary to make in fo rm ed dec isions in the marketpl ace. When info rmati on is
he ld perfectly among all pani cs the onl y pos ibl e outcome is the most effic ient, or most
fair transaction , in whi ch th e price o ffered by suppli ers meets the pri ce demand by
bu ye rs.
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Th e battle for perfec t in fonnation or fu ll educat ion and awa reness of al l parti es is
certainl y not an easy one, but at thi s point il is much too soon to doubt its potentia l
beca use it has onl y scarce ly been used as a preventati ve too l. Most current borrowers do
11 0 1

ha ve fin a ncial educat ion, most have 11 01 tak en hom e bu ye r co urses, and man y of the

borrowers currentl y ent ering the subprim c market are 11 0 1 prepared mentall y or
financ iall y lor the long-term respons ibi liti es of owning ho mes, and in my opin ion should
be di ss uaded from pursuin g homeownershi p until th ey are ready. I believe that an
ed ucated popu lation of borrowers wo uld seriously curtail mo rtgage lendin g abuses. In
spit e of th e changing views I have had throughout thi s project ! am confiden t that the data
present ed in chap ter four spea ks for it self, and th at had th e data col lecti on and analys is
been under th e direct ion of another prim ary researcher that very simil ar co nclu sions
wo uld ha ve been reached.

Suggesti ons for Future Research

The ground work has been estab li shed lor a thorough definit ion and desc rip tion of
predatory lendin g in Utah has been set throu gh thi s resea rch. There are many addition al
research end eavo rs that ca n proceed from thi s stud y, such as a quantitati ve stud y th at
meas ures some of the fac tors, practi ces, and characteri sti cs desc ri bed in thi s resea rch to
determine their degree of influ ence on unfair lending. It co uld also be very use fu l to
co nduct a simi larl y designed qua li tati ve study to interview victims of predatory/unfair
lending. Such a stud y wo uld be use ful for identifying their responsiveness to certa in
ed ucational ideas, and awareness issues, and fo r verifi cat ion of factors, prac ti ces and
characteristi cs that led to their vict imi zati on. On a broader sca le, th e area of fin ancial
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educati o n is c rucial and a lso requires furth e r research . Issues of timin g of educati o n,
qua li ty of ed ucation method s, and o ptim a l quantities of education are all wo rth y resea rc h
e nd eavors.
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Appendi x A . Info rm ed Co nsent Form
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Date Crea ted Aug ust 29, 2005
Utj h St;lk University IRB Approved 09/01 / 2005
Approval termina tes 08/3 1/ 200(>
Protocol Number: ti 1346
IIW l'assword Protected per Tr~~e M. l{ubal. IRB Administratm

Informed Consent

" l)efin ing Prcd:.1t ory Mortgage Lending in Ut:-1 h"
Professor Lucy Delgad illo and graduate student Luke Erickso n in the Department of Family

Consumer and Human Development at Utah State University are conducting a resea rch study to help define
Predatory Mortgage Lending in Utah You have been asked to participate beca use you work in the real
esta te industry
You wi ll be asked to sha re exper iences a nd op ini ons in a race-to-face interview tha t ma y last 20
minutes or no more than 2 hours, de pend ing on you r response to our questio ns. Your responses will be
audio recorded and kept co nfid en tial unless you wis h to be named in th e fina l report of th e researc h study.
At that time, yo u wi ll need 10 sign an approval statement. After data collection, all not es and recordings
wi ll be kept in a locked fil e cabinet in a locked ofrice until completi on of the resea rch proj ec t. The
record ings and notes wil l be des troyed approxima tely 10 months afier th e study is co mpleted.

There me no d irect bene fits to partici pate in this study at thi s time; howeve r, indirectly the home
lending env ironmen t cou ld be improved increas ing th e sat isfaction of bo rrowers and lend ers as we ll as third
parties. There arc no anticipated ri sks in vo lved in participa ting in this resea rch. If you have any questions
you may con tact ei ther Luke Eri ckso n al (435) 797-3408 or Professo r Delgadi llo al (435) 797-7204.
Your partic ipation is volu nl<lry and you may withdraw at any time without co nseq uence . Any
in iOrmation obta ined wil l be destroyed sho uld you decide to wi thdraw. The Institutiona l Rev iew Boa rd
(IRB) for the protection of part icipants in resea rch at Utah State Univers it y has approved this study. If you
have any quest ions or concern s about your rights yo u ma y ca ll them at (435) 797- 182 1.
You ha ve been give n two copies or the inrormed consent. Please sign both co pies, keep one copy
Cor yourself and return th e second copy to the researc hers
The research has been expla ined to the client by Luke Erickson or me and s/ he understan ds the st ud y,
poss ib le ri sks and benefits, and that taking part in th e slllcl y is comp lete ly volu ntary. The client has had a
ch<:Hlce to ask questions and th ey ha ve been answered.

Professo r Luc y Delgadillo Ph .D
Date
Dep t. of Fami ly, Co nsum er & Human Dev.
Utah State Univers ity
2905 Old Main .H ill , Logan, UT 84322-2905
Telephone: (435) 797-7204
Fax
(435) 797-3 845
E-mai l
lucy~llL!J::<c·Jb.!!,_s;Qu

Luke Erickson
Research Assis tan t
( 435) 797-7204

By signi ng my sig nature I agree to partic ipate: ---:::--,-,----c--=- - Partici pant 's Signature

Date

Date
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Appendi x B. Int er view Questi ons

11 8
Biographi ca l Questions

I . W hat is yo ur c urrent tit le?
2. How lon g have you been in thi s pos iti on?
3. Co uld yo u bri e n y desc ri be any previous pos iti ons re lated to mort gage le ndi ng'1
4. How have your prev ious pos itions led to yo ur c urrent position?
5. What ki nd of contact do yo u have with others in the local and state mortgage mark ets?
6. How wo uld yo u generally describe yo ur ex perience in the mortgage marke t in Utah?

Main Resea rc h Ques tio ns

I . How wo uld yo u desc ri be or de fin e abu sive mo rtgage lendin g?
2. Wo ul d say that the term " predato ry le ndin g" ca ptures w hat yo u have just desc ribed, o r
arc th e re di rre rc nces between th em·)
3. Wha t do you feel is the m agn itud e or ex te nt of hi gh cost and abusive loa ns in Utah?
4 . What are the major factors behind the ex is tence of hi gh cost and abusive home loans?
5. What arc th e specific abusive practi ces yo u have seen in hom e loans?
6. W hat are the common characterist ics of borrowers w ho end up w ith predatory and/o r
ab us ive loa ns?
7. In yo ur o pini o n, w hat co uld be done to reduce predatory mortgage lendin g in Uta h?

Other Qu esti ons

Who e lse in s tat e wo uld you recommend I inte rview to get more informat io n o n
predato ry mo rt gage lend ing?

11 9

Do yo u have thi s person's contact in fo rm ati on?
Do yo u th ink the questi ons I asked yo u wo uld be suffi cient for an interview wi th
thi s person, or wo ul d you recomm end changes?
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Appendi x C. Cod ing Scheme of Res ults
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Research Obj ecti ve On e: A Definiti on

Abusive Lending
Predatory Lending
Predatory Lendin g vs . Abusi ve Lendin g
Fraudul ent Lendin g
Fraudul ent vs . Abu sive and Predatory Lendin g
Th e Term "Predatory Lend ing"
Unfair Lendin g

Resea rch Obj ecti ve Two: The Magnitud e o f Unfair
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Researc h Objecti ve Three: Vic tim Charac te risti cs

The Co-co11spirator
N0 11 -horro 1vers

Borrowers
Perso11al Allriluaes
Emotional Chamcteristics
of Borrowers

Fin ancial Characteristics
of Borrowers

General U11derstanding of
the Mortgage Market
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l

Research Objective Four: Factors
that Foster Unf'air Lendin g Practices

H

J

Industry Factors

'-----~--..-~______./

H

Market Complexity

J

H

Booming Housin g Market

I

y

The Market System

I

-{

Factors Related to the Genera l Public

WL

____~_

-{

Legal Factors

]

___)

-{

Accountability

l

-{

Jurisdictiona l Bo undaries

I

Overlapping Factors

I

-{ Obstacles to Victim Redress

~

-{
-{
-{

Lack of Resources for
Prevention and Reparation
Pressure to Arrange Bad
Loans
Lack of Measurement
Standards

Summary of Obj ec tive Four

I

l
l
l
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Adj ustab le Rate
Mortgages
3 Year Cyc le of Loan Offi ce r
Employment

Teaser Rate

Bait and Sw itch

Balloon Pa yments

Lending Cannibalism

Cred it Insurance

Crim inal Conduct

Financed Fees

Eq uity Based Lending

Hidclen Cha r><es

Mis lead ing In forma tion

Hi gh Fees

Sc heme to Steal from
Bo rro wers

Hi gh In terest Rat es
In terest On ly Loan s

Multip le Sa lary Qualifi ca ti on
Flipping
Abusive Servicing
Steering
Unaffordabl e Lendi ng
Preyin g o n Vuln erabilities
Abu sive Networkin.g
Over Appra isin.g

Prepa ymen t Pena lti es
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r Resea rch Objective Six: Suggestions for J
l Red uction of Predatory Lending
r1L________L_e~g~isll~at~io='=,=======~J________________,

HProhibitive Legislation Not Effective I
I
H In crease Accountability
H
H

Impro ve Victim Red ress Systems

-{

Bridge Juri sdictional Boundaries

Geographical Tracking

1

I
L{ Mandatory Ed ucation for Bo rrowers I
]

r1L_____C_o_n_,_n,_'_'n,i~ty_S__u~pp~o_r_t____JI
,--------------------,

-{~====F=a=i'=·=H=o=u=s=in=g=C==o=n=,'=n=it=te=e=s====~l

J

Neighborhood Rev itali zation
Programs
, - - - - - - - - - - - -~--------------,
Change Industry and BorrowerJ
-{
Incen ti ves
{

r1L___~R~c~a~r~ra~n~~~e~ln~d~'~'s~t,~·v_l~n~c~e~n~ti~v~e~s___JI
U

Rea rrange Borrower In centi ves

[ ' - - - - - --

I

----'

,--------------------,

--{

Financial Ed ucation

I

-{

Homebuver Ed ucat ion

I

-{

Awareness

-{

Resou rces

I
l

~

Shopping

l

-{

Financial Education in the Schoo ls

)

